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Against Feasibility Analysis 
 
Jonathan Masur and Eric A. Posner1 
 
 
Abstract. Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the 
major alternative to cost-benefit analysis. Although regulatory agencies have used feasibility 
analysis (in some contexts called “technology-based” analysis) longer than cost-benefit analysis, 
feasibility analysis has received far less attention in the scholarly literature. In recent years, 
however, critics of cost-benefit analysis have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative. 
We advance the debate by uncovering the analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its 
normative premises, and then criticizing them. Our account builds on two examples of feasibility 
analysis, one conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA. We find that feasibility analysis leads to 
both under- and over-regulation, and we conclude that it lacks a normative justification and should 
have no place in government regulation. 
 
 Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the 
major alternative to cost-benefit analysis. A regulation satisfies feasibility analysis if it reduces a 
risk of harm to the maximum extent possible without having a major negative impact on the 
economy such as “widespread plant closings.” By contrast, a regulation satisfies cost-benefit 
analysis if it produces benefits (in terms of deaths, injuries, and other losses avoid) greater than 
the cost of compliance. Although agencies have used feasibility analysis (in some contexts, 
called “technology-based” analysis) longer than cost-benefit analysis, feasibility analysis has 
received far less attention in the scholarly literature. In recent years, however, critics of cost-
benefit analysis have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative. The dispute over these 
standards will carry over into the Obama administration,2 and for that reason a critical 
assessment of the feasibility standard is long overdue. 
 When Congress authorizes agencies to regulate, it occasionally provides detailed 
instructions but more typically issues vague standards. These standards appear in numerous 
different formulations, but most statutes fall into two groups. In the first, Congress directs the 
agency to reduce a risk to the extent “feasible,” or to the “maximum” extent, with no mention of 
costs. For example, the Occupational Health and Safety Act requires the OHSA secretary to 
ensure “to the extent feasible” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers’ 
                                                 
1 University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Emily Buss, Adam Cox, Frank Easterbrook, Jake Gersen, Martha 
Nussbaum, Arden Rowell, Adam Samaha, David Weisbach, Adrian Vermeule, and participants at a workshop at the 
University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth for excellent research 
assistance. 
2 President Obama has nominated Cass Sunstein, a prominent defender of cost-benefit analysis, to head the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs. See CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2004). Two prominent critics, Liza 
Heinzerling and Chris Schroeder, have been appointed to positions in EPA and the Justice Department, respectively. 
Both Heinzerling and Schroeder have endorsed feasibility analysis. See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in 
the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2006); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008). 
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health.3 In the second, Congress directs the agency to consider the costs as well as the benefits of 
risk reduction. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act directs the EPA to consider “all 
relevant aspects of the risk . . . and a comparison of the estimated costs of complying with 
actions taken under this chapter.”4 Agencies tend to use feasibility analysis for the first category 
of statute and cost-benefit analysis for the second category of statute, though it is by no means 
clear that they are legally obligated to do so, and there are some exceptions and mixed cases. 
Courts have afforded agencies significant latitude under the Chevron doctrine.5 
 In 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order requiring agencies to use cost-
benefit analysis for major regulations.6 His successors through George W. Bush have renewed 
that order;7 President Obama has not yet acted. The executive orders do not require agencies to 
use cost-benefit analysis in violation of statutory mandates, so their effect has been to more 
sharply bifurcate agency practice. Agencies applying statutes that permit them to consider costs 
have, since 1981, applied cost-benefit analysis more rigorously and systematically. Agencies 
applying statutes that do not permit them to consider costs, or permit them to do so in a fashion 
that falls short of cost-benefit analysis, now report cost-benefit analyses of their regulations but 
do not follow them and instead continue to use feasibility analysis to guide regulatory decision-
making. 
 President Reagan’s executive order unleashed an enormous literature on cost-benefit 
analysis. The debate continues to this day. Defenders argue that cost-benefit analysis produces 
better regulations, enhances transparency, and brings rigor to the regulatory process.8 Critics 
argue that cost-benefit analysis has weak normative foundations and, in practice, forces agencies 
to ignore real but difficult-to-monetize regulatory benefits, resulting in underregulation of the 
environment, the workplace, and other domains.9 Until recently, the critics have never been very 
                                                 
3 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). 
4 15 U.S.C. 2605(c). 
5 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
6 Exec. Order 12,291. 
7 Exec. Order 12,886. 
8 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); RICHARD L. 
REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER 
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW 
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A 
Response to Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021 (2004); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles (AEI 1996), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=203. 
9 David M. Driesen et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REGULATION & 
GOVERNANCE 48 (2009); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1581 (2002); Steven Kelman, Cost-
Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, Regulation 33 (1981). A recent letter signed by several law professors 
expressed concern about Cass Sunstein’s appointment to OIRA because of his support for cost-benefit analysis and 
regulatory centralization. See John S. Applegate et al., Reinvigorating Protection of Health, Safety, and the 
Environment: The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein, (January 2009), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SunsteinOIRA901.pdf. 
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clear about what decision-procedure they prefer to cost-benefit analysis. But feasibility analysis 
has become their white knight. They argue that feasibility analysis rests on a stronger normative 
foundation than cost-benefit analysis does, and is just as rigorous and transparent.10 
 There is an earlier literature from the 1980s and 1990s that criticized environmental 
regulation that relied on technology-based standards—a quasi-synonym for feasibility analysis. 
However, this literature had a different focus from the current debate.11 Then, critics argued that 
EPA’s regulations were costly and inefficient because command-and-control regulation fails to 
exploit market incentives.12 The criticism led to proposals that cap-and-trade systems and similar 
market-based mechanisms be used, and endorsement in some quarters of cost-benefit analysis.13 
But the critics never addressed feasibility analysis on its own terms. It may well have been that 
EPA never applied the test appropriately rather than that the test was flawed. 
 Part of the problem was no doubt that the feasibility test had never been given a clear 
account. What does it mean to say that an agency must reduce a risk to the point at which 
“widespread plant closings” occur? Can this term be given a precise definition? And why exactly 
are widespread plant closings to be avoided? These questions have not received clear answers, 
with the result that the debate has proceeded in a cloud of ambiguity. We try to advance the 
debate by uncovering the analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its normative premises, and 
then criticizing them.14 Our account builds on two examples of feasibility analysis, one 
conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA.15 We conclude that feasibility analysis lacks a 
normative justification and should have no place in government regulation. 
                                                 
10 David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility 
Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005); Driesen et al., 
supra note 9; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 205-07 (defending technology-based standards of Clean 
Air Act); Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,297 (2004) (arguing that the EPA must employ feasibility analysis); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Wendy E. Wagner, The 
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING 
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Thomas O. McGarrity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale For Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729 
(1991); FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 90 (1989). See also DANIEL 
FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999) 
(proposing a reconciliation of cost-benefit analysis and feasibility analysis that combines elements of each); Sidney 
A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. 
ENVT’L L. REV. 433, 483-84 (2008) (proposing a type of “pragmatic” risk analysis largely consistent with feasibility 
analysis). 
11 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 
(1985). 
12 Id. 
13 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulation). 
14 Others have criticized feasibility analysis, usually on the grounds that it is vague. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8. 
But as defenders have pointed out, all decision-procedures, including cost-benefit analysis, have this problem, at 
least to some extent. Other critics have addressed the record of its use by agencies. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, 
supra note 11. We will focus instead on its analytic and normative foundations. Although a number of sources have 
touched on this issue, none has been comprehensive. We cite them as appropriate below. 
15 These examples are only two of many that have been issued over the years. We have not tried to do a survey but 
we chose these two because they seem representative and are relatively clear. After the EPA regulation we discuss 
4 
 
I. Legal Background 
 
 Feasibility analysis is not a single statutory standard, nor is it a single, consistent 
methodology. Rather, feasibility analysis is a term that encompasses a spectrum of agency 
practices taken under the ambit of a wide variety of statutory mandates. All of these statutes by 
their plain terms appear to demand some type of stringent health or safety regulation that does 
not rely on calculations of costs and benefits. In the sections that follow, we describe the legal 
apparatus surrounding feasibility analysis in some detail. 
 
A. Statutory Framework 
 
 When Congress regulates an environmental or workplace hazard, it frequently does so on 
a technological or results-oriented basis. That is, Congress often mandates the installation of a 
particular level of pollution-controlling technology, or more generally it requires that an agency 
achieve a particular level of safety with respect to some hazard. The level of technology or the 
result sought is frequently described in vague terms by Congress, leaving the agency with ample 
interpretive authority. Nonetheless, many of these statutory mandates share a common feature: 
they require the most protective or restrictive level of pollution or hazard control possible, 
subject only to modest limitations. For instance, one section of the Clean Air Act requires that 
polluters install the “best available control technology” with the goal of achieving the “maximum 
available reduction” of regulated air pollutants.16 At the same time, these statutes do not 
explicitly require a comparison of costs and benefits. Rather, regulated industries are directed to 
install a type of technology or achieve a level of safety, whose benefits are left unspecified. The 
limitations placed on the technology are occasionally couched in terms of costs,17 but are more 
frequently left in more demanding (if vaguer) terms—for instance, “best available technology.”.  
 Scholars have argued that these statutes call for “feasibility analysis,” a term borrowed 
from the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which protects workplace safety “to the extent 
feasible.”18 According to these scholars, an agency regulating under one of these statutory 
provisions should not engage in cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it should examine only whether a 
particular level of regulation is technologically and economically feasible: whether the 
technological means exist to implement the regulation, and whether the regulation will cause 
significant economic harm to the regulated industry, to the point of triggering “widespread plant 
                                                                                                                                                             
was issued, EPA issued guidelines on its regulatory approach, including its use of feasibility analysis. These 
guidelines are consistent with the approach that it used in the regulation that we examine, and subsequent 
regulations seem largely consistent with it as well. See  
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (Clean Air Act). 
17 E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (mandating the “maximum degree of reduction . . . achievable . . .taking into 
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction . . . .”). 
18 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). 
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shutdowns.”19 Only regulations that would threaten to bankrupt a large segment of the affected 
industry are barred under feasibility analysis.20 According to this conception of feasibility 
analysis, an agency cannot select a less stringent regulatory standard (among several options) 
when the more stringent option would not lead to plant shutdowns.21 It is thus unsurprising that 
feasibility analysis has generally been regarded as favoring strong regulation, by comparison to 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 At the same time, the general heading of “feasibility analysis” masks wide variation 
among both statutory mandates and actual agency practices. In later sections we examine the 
ways in which OSHA and EPA actually perform feasibility analysis. Here, we canvas several of 
the most important statutory phrases that are understood to trigger some version of feasibility 
analysis. In order to provide a standard for comparison, we also highlight several statutes that 
appear to call for something closer to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
1. Workplace Safety 
 
The term “feasibility analysis” derives from the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
which instructs OSHA to set the standard “which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . 
. . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.”22 That 
standard must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment 
and places of employment.”23 “Most adequately assures, to the extent feasible” reads as though 
the full extent of costs and benefits are largely irrelevant. The regulator is to require a safety 
measure, as long as the measure is “feasible.” “[R]easonably necessary . . . to provide safe or 
healthful employment” appears to incorporate some measure of the benefits provided, but 
without any directive to balance them against costs. 
Similarly, the Mine Act instructs the Secretary of Labor to “set standards which most 
adequately assure on the basis of the best available evidence that no miner will suffer material 
impairment of health or functional capacity.”24 That section notes that “[i]n addition to the 
attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the miner, other 
considerations shall be . . . the feasibility of the standards . . . .”25 This statute, like the safety and 
health statute, makes no mention of compliance costs. 
                                                 
19 Driesen, supra note 10, at 3 (2005); see also Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 2, at 483; Heinzerling, supra note 2, 
at 1102 n. 37. 
20 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“[A]s for 
economic feasibility, OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs and demonstrate a reasonable 
likelihood that these costs will not threaten the existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does 
portend disaster for some marginal firms.”). 
21 Driesen, supra note 10, at 17; Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
22 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 
23 29 U.S.C § 652(8). 
24 30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A). 
25 Id. 
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2. Environmental Protection 
 
 Environmental statutes involve an extensive array of verbal formulations, some of which 
appear to trigger feasibility analysis and others of which call for an approach more akin to cost-
benefit analysis. 
 Best available technology. The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
and Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs instruct the EPA to require that each new 
pollution-emitting firm employ “the best available control technology for each pollutant.”26 The 
Clean Air Act elsewhere defines “best available control technology” to mean a technology that 
will provide “the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant . . . which the permitting 
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility.”27 Similarly, the New Source 
provisions of the Clean Air Act sets as the EPA’s regulatory goal “the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction . . . (taking 
into account the cost of achieving such reduction . . .).”28 Here, as with OSHA, the objective is 
stated in categorical terms (“maximum degree of reduction”), and while the statute references 
economic costs, regulation is subject only to the limitation that those reductions be “achievable.” 
As proponents of feasibility analysis have noted, the most straightforward way of achieving the 
maximum degree of reduction of a particular pollutant is to simply close down every factory that 
creates it.29 In that sense, proponents of feasibility analysis view the principle that regulation 
must not trigger widespread bankruptcies as a concession to practical economic realities. 
 Similarly, portions of the Clean Water Act require the use of “the best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,”30 while others “require application of 
the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class”31 or the 
“greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable 
through application of the best available demonstrated control technology.”32 Like the Clean Air 
Act, however, these statutory provisions are not silent on matters of costs. When regulating 
pursuant to these statutes, the EPA must “take into consideration the cost of achieving” 
reductions in water pollution.33 At the same time, categorical insistence upon the “best available 
technology,” subject only to the consideration that it be “economically achievable” (or that the 
agency merely “consider” costs), has led sympathetic observers to conclude that the statute 
demands feasibility analysis, rather than cost-benefit analysis. 
                                                 
26 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
29 Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); 
Driesen, supra note 10, at 10. 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i). 
32 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1). 
33 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B). 
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 These formulations are of course not identical; it may be that in differentiating between 
the “best available control technology” and the “best available demonstrated control technology” 
Congress meant to define some important difference in treatment. However, despite these 
variations, the EPA has largely behaved as if these statutory standards called for similar types 
and levels of regulation.34 
 “Reasonably available” and “best practicable” technology. Not all environmental 
statutes are so strict. Several provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act call for a type 
of review similar to cost-benefit analysis or set a more lenient regulatory standard than those 
listed above. For instance, the section of the Clean Air Act governing “non-attainment areas”—
those parts of the country that have not met the EPA’s ambient air quality standards—calls for 
“the implementation of all reasonably available control measures,” including “reasonably 
available control technology.”35 Similarly, a general provision of the Clean Water Act governing 
pollutant discharges calls for “the application of the best practicable control technology currently 
available.”36 In determining what technology to classify as the “best practicable,” the EPA is 
expected to “consider[] of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent 
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application.”37 Another section of the Clean Water 
Act directs the EPA to “require application of the best conventional pollutant control 
technology,”38 and in so doing to “include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship 
between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits 
derived.”39 
The Clean Water Act’s admonition to consider the reasonableness of the relationship 
between costs and benefits in the course of choosing the “best practicable” technology is best 
understood as calling for cost-benefit analysis. Other readings of the statute are certainly 
conceivable, but even opponents of cost-benefit analysis have admitted that this is the best 
interpretation of that provision.40 The Clean Air Act, for its part, stops short of explicitly 
requiring cost-benefit analysis. Nonetheless, the use of “reasonableness” as a touchstone seems 
to beg for a comparison of costs and benefits, just as it does in other areas of law.41 
 We summarize the most important of these statutes in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
                                                 
34 See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 
36 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i). 
37 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 
38 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
39 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). 
40 Driesen, supra note 19, at 22-25. 
41 E.g., United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949) (“reasonable person” in tort law involves cost-
benefit balancing); People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Col. 2000) (“reasonable person” in the criminal law involves cost-
benefit balancing). 
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B. OIRA, Executive Order 12,866, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 The statutes described above are not the only legal constraint imposed upon OSHA and 
the EPA. Under Executive Order 12,886, each federal agency must conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of any proposed regulation with an expected economic impact greater than $100 
million.42 These cost-benefit analyses are reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), which has the authority to reject the regulation or return it to the agency for 
further consideration.43 However, this constraint is entirely internal to the administration: no 
outside group can sue an agency for failing to comply with an executive order, and of course no 
executive order can override a statutory mandate.44 
Agencies thus find themselves whipsawed. In a variety of cases, the EPA must regulate 
under the terms of a statute that appears to call for feasibility analysis and an executive order that 
demands cost-benefit analysis. If the EPA opts for a stringent regulation that may produce more 
costs than benefits, it risks having the regulation rejected by OIRA; if EPA chooses a different 
regulation that maximizes net benefits, it risks having that regulation challenged (by outside 
groups) as incompatible with the agency’s statutory mandate. In theory, of course, OIRA’s 
preference for cost-benefit analysis should give way when an alternate approach is mandated by 
statute. In reality, however, OIRA and the EPA may have different interpretations of what, 
precisely, a statute demands. In addition, the EPA may have some amount of interpretive 
freedom under the familiar Chevron deference standard,45 which may lead OIRA to push the 
EPA to exercise that interpretive authority by regulating pursuant to cost-benefit analysis. 
Tension between Executive Order 12,866 and the plain language of many statutes is 
unavoidable. 
 
C. Judicial Interpretations 
 
 OSHA and the EPA have promulgated hundreds of regulations under the feasibility-
based statutes described above, and challenges to those regulations have reached the appellate 
courts on dozens of occasions. Nearly every case involves either a claim by an environmental or 
labor group that the agency has not regulated strictly enough, or a claim by a private firm or 
industry group that it has regulated too strictly. The latter is frequently accompanied by an 
                                                 
42 Exec. Order 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C); § 3(f)(1) (1993). 
43 Id. § 6(b); Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1100 & nn. 16 & 17. 
44 The executive orders state as much themselves. Exec. Order 12,866 § 1(a) (1993) (“Further, in choosing among 
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits . . . unless a 
statute requires another regulatory approach.”); id. § 9 (“Nothing in this order shall be construed as displacing the 
agencies' authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.”); id. § 10 (“Nothing in this Executive order shall affect 
any otherwise available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve the 
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or 
employees, or any other person.”). 
45 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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argument that the agency improperly failed to employ cost-benefit analysis; the former often 
involves a claim that the agency illegally employed cost-benefit analysis. From this voluminous 
record of judicial review, two important conclusions emerge.46 
 First, the federal courts—led by the Supreme Court—will not force agencies to use cost-
benefit analysis in regulating when the governing statute appears to trigger feasibility analysis. 
For instance, in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, the Court held that 
“to the extent feasible” language in the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not require 
OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, validating a regulation that would not have led to 
widespread financial problems but might also not have passed a cost-benefit test.47 In similar 
fashion, courts of appeals have repeatedly upheld OSHA48 and EPA49 regulations governed by 
“feasibility” or “best available technology” statutory language against arguments by industry 
groups that those regulations are not cost-benefit justified. Courts have stated repeatedly that 
those statutes do not obligate OSHA and the EPA to conduct cost-benefit analyses, and that a 
failure to perform such analysis does not render the resulting regulations legally infirm.  
 Second, the EPA—and likely OSHA as well—is permitted to employ cost-benefit 
analysis in lieu of feasibility analysis as an exercise of its discretion under Chevron. This appears 
to be the case even for the most stringent of statutory standards. In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc.,50 decided in April 2009, the Supreme Court announced that the EPA could use cost-benefit 
analysis when regulating under a section of the Clean Water Act that mandates use of the “best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”51 The Court held that the 
agency’s decision was reasonable under Chevron,52 despite classifying the “best technology 
available” provision as the most stringent statutory standard contained within the Clean Water 
Act.53 And perhaps not surprisingly, the Court also suggested that (less stringent) statutory 
                                                 
46 Many of these cases take the form of hard look review challenges to the rationality behind the agency’s decision. 
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (announcing the standard for hard 
look review). These types of challenges are necessarily highly fact specific, and we do not dwell on their minutiae 
here. Rather, we are concerned with how the courts have treated arguments that agencies should or should not be 
using cost-benefit analysis in the presence of statutes that appear to call for feasibility analysis. 
47 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
48 Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975 (D.C.Cir.1991) (lead exposure standard); Public Citizen Health 
Research Group v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (chromium exposure standard); Kennecott 
Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety and Health Administration, 476 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (diesel 
particulate matter regulated under the Mine Act). 
49 Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (nitrous oxide regulation under a “best available 
control technology” standard); Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In applying 
the BAT standard, the EPA is not obligated to evaluate the reasonableness of the relationship between costs and 
benefits.”); American Paper Institute v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no requirement that EPA balance 
costs and benefits under a “best available demonstrated control technology” standard); Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 
1102 n. 32 (collecting cases). 
50 129 S. Ct. 1498. 
51 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis added). 
52 Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1510. It is worth noting that this portion of the Court’s opinion garnered six votes, with 
Justice Breyer concurring. Id. at 1512. 
53 Id. at 1507. 
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sections requiring the EPA to select the “best available technology economically achievable” and 
“best available demonstrated control technology” would similarly allow for regulation based on 
cost-benefit analysis.54 
 In fact, so far as we are aware, no court of appeals has ever rejected an agency decision to 
employ cost-benefit analysis as exceeding that agency’s interpretive authority under Chevron. 
Courts of appeals have occasionally used strong language rejecting cost-benefit analysis as 
“incompatible” with feasibility-based statutory provisions,55 but those statements came always in 
the context of an agency decision not to perform cost-benefit analysis. Given the deference to 
agency interpretation shown by the court in Entergy, it is difficult to believe that many 
“feasibility”-based statutory sections will prohibit agencies from regulating on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis. Going forward, agencies may simply have the option of selecting between cost-
benefit analysis and feasibility analysis, with courts willing to approve either methodology.56 
 
II. Feasibility Analysis in Practice 
 
A. OSHA’S Chromium Regulation 
 
1. Background and Health Effects 
 
Hexavalent chromium, Cr (VI), is a predominantly manmade compound57 used in 
approximately thirty major industries.58 It is used to produce alloys, such as stainless steel, which 
are then often employed in welding or to form surface protection layers for plate metal and 
plastic substrates.59 Cr (VI) compounds are also used as “ingredients and catalysts” in the 
production of pigments and chemicals.60 However, Cr (VI) is known to cause lung cancer in 
addition to lesser ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal 
ulcers.61 
As of 2004, OSHA regulations set a maximum personal exposure level for workers 
dealing with Cr (VI) of 52 μg/m3. This meant that workers could be exposed to a concentration 
                                                 
54 Id. (“It is not obvious to us that [the proposition that cost-benefit analysis is precluded under the BATEA and 
BADT tests] is correct, but we need not pursue that point . . . .”). 
55 Public Citizen, 557 F.3d at 177 (“We note that the Supreme Court has conclusively ruled that economic feasibility 
does not involve a cost-benefit analysis.”). 
56 It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether this statutory interpretation is correct in each and every 
instance; our argument is principally that, if given the option, agencies should prefer cost-benefit analysis. 
57 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10104 (2006). 
58 Id. at 10108, 10227. OSHA estimated that Cr (VI) is used by approximately 52,000 individual businesses and 
facilities. Id. 
59 Id. at 10108.  
60 Id.   
61 Id. at 10108, 10166, 10174. Studies show that in addition to inhalation, “direct hand-to-nose contact” can also 
result in these symptoms. Id. at 10170. In the course of examining the threat to worker health posed by Cr (VI), 
OSHA determined that a “linear relative risk model”—according to which the health risk posed by Cr (VI) exposure 
scales linearly with the amount to which a worker is exposed—best fit the available data. Id. at 10220. 
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of chromium in the air they were breathing equal to 52 micrograms per cubic meter. OSHA 
determined that lowering the allowable level of chromium exposure could prevent as many as 
250 deaths per year.62 This triggered OSHA’s statutory obligation to “assure[], to the extent 
feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.” 63 
Accordingly, OSHA initiated rulemaking proceedings and set out to amend the existing 
standard.64 
 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 As part of the regulatory process (and to comply with Executive Order 12,866), OSHA 
undertook a cost-benefit analysis in which it examined a variety of possible regulatory standards 
ranging from 0.25 μg/m3 to 20 μg/m3. OSHA estimated the number of fatal and non-fatal cancers 
that could be prevented by imposing each of these exposure limits. (Other than a small additive 
factor for cases of dermatitis,65 OSHA did not include any other non-cancer illnesses due to a 
lack of data on the likelihood of those conditions and their costs.66) OSHA then monetized the 
benefits of avoiding these cancers using the EPA standard valuation of $6.8 million per life 
saved and a range of values for nonfatal cancers extending from $188,502 per cancer avoided 
(the medical cost of treating such an illness) to $4 million (the best estimate of individuals’ 
willingness to pay to avoid a nonfatal case).67 OSHA then discounted the projected annual 
monetized benefits to present value, performing one calculation using a rate of 3% and another 
calculation with a 7% discount rate.68 Table 1 displays the results of OSHA’s cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
62 Id. at 10221. 
63 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). 
64 The rule is set out in 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, and was upheld by the third circuit, see Public Citizen Health Research 
Group v. United States Department of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
65 71 Fed. Reg. 10305, 07. Medical costs per case were estimated to be $119 and secondary costs $1,239. Id. at 
10307. Based on an incidence of 0.2-1%, OSHA estimated 418-2,089 cases of dermatitis annually and presumed a 
50% reduction to 209-1,045 cases. Id. 
66 Id. at 10307.  
67 Id. at 10305.  
68 Id. at 10305 (Table VIII-11). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) currently recommends that agencies 
perform cost-benefit analysis using discount rates of both 3% and 7%. See Office of Management and Budget, 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. at 53,520 (Nov. 10, 1992); OMB Circular A-4, 33-34 
(September, 2003). 
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Table 1: OSHA Cr (VI) Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Exposure Limit 0.25 μg/m3 0.5 μg/m3 1 μg/m3 5 μg/m3 10 μg/m3 20 μg/m3 
Fatal Cancers 
Avoided 
66 - 258 62 - 243 58 - 224 40 - 145 27 - 95 15 - 47 
Non-Fatal Cancers 
Avoided 
9 - 35 8 – 33 8 – 31 5 – 20 4 – 13 2 - 6 
Monetized 
Benefits (7% 
discount rate) 
$60 - 891 $57 - 841  $53 - 776  $36 - 504  $25 - 328  $13 - 162  
Monetized 
Benefits (3% 
discount rate) 
$189 – 1,587 $176 – 1,496 
$164 – 
1,382  
$112 - 896 $77 - 584  $41 - 288 
Total 
Costs 
$1,615  $1,033 $570  $282 $170 $112 
Median Net Benefit 
(7% discount rate) 
-$1,340 -$584 -$156 -$12 $6 -$24 
Median Net Benefit 
(3% discount rate) 
-$874 -$160 $221 $231 $165 $56 
Note: dollar figures refer to millions of 2003 dollars. 
 
 As Table 1 shows, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the potential costs and 
benefit of chromium regulation. Many of the high and low estimates of benefits are more than an 
order of magnitude apart, and the choice of discount rate affected the calculations of benefits by 
approximately a factor of two. (This is in addition to the fact that the cost-benefit analysis 
incorporates only cancers and dermatitis and excludes other illnesses.) The cost-benefit analysis 
nevertheless provides a significant amount of information. While the health consequences of 
chromium exposure scale approximately linearly, the costs of complying with increasingly 
stringent standards clearly do not. Rather, they increase exponentially as the regulatory standard 
becomes stricter. For instance, the cost to industry of complying with a 5 μg/m3 exposure limit is 
$112 million greater than the cost of complying with a 10 μg/m3 exposure limit, while the cost of 
complying with a 0.25 μg/m3 limit is nearly $600 million greater than the cost of complying with 
a 0.5 μg/m3 standard. 
Accordingly, the 0.25 μg/m3 standard is not cost-benefit justified under any set of 
assumptions, while the 0.5 μg/m3 standard is not cost-benefit justified under any but the most 
optimistic assumptions. On the other hand, both the 5 μg/m3 and 10 μg/m3 standards would 
produce greater net benefits than the 20 μg/m3 standard under nearly any set of assumptions. 
OSHA’s cost-benefit analysis is thus helpful in narrowing the range of useful possibilities, even 
taking into account the high degree of uncertainty involved. The socially optimal exposure limit 
for Cr (VI) likely lies somewhere within the range of 1-10 μg/m3. 
In its original notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA suggested an exposure limit of 1 
μg/m3.69 When OSHA eventually published the final rule, the agency had revised its regulatory 
                                                 
69 69 Fed. Reg. 59306, 59448-49 (2004). 
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goals and settled on an exposure limit of 5 μg/m3. OSHA never fully explained the reasons for 
this change, and the ultimate rationale behind it remains unclear. However, OSHA may have 
been under pressure from several fronts: it received a number of negative comments from 
potentially regulated parties about the proposed 1 μg/m3 standard; a preliminary feasibility 
analysis showed that such a stringent limitation might put several industries under significant 
pressure (more on this later);70 and in addition OSHA may have been influenced by the cost-
benefit analysis outlined above. 
 
3. Feasibility Analysis 
 
Before promulgating a regulation setting a new exposure limit of 5 μg/m3, OSHA was of 
course required to conduct a feasibility analysis. The Occupational Safety and Health Act does 
not define “feasibility”—the specifics are left to the agency. Here, OSHA attached a particular 
set of numerical values to that statutory standard. OSHA policy required that in order for a 
regulation to be considered economically feasible—in the sense of avoiding widespread plant 
closings—it must not cause revenue within an industry to decline by more than 1% or profits to 
decline by more than 10%.71 (We refer to this as OSHA’s “1%/10% rule.”) However, OSHA 
reserved the right to except industries from this standard under certain circumstances—to impose 
regulations even though projected profit or revenue declines would exceed the 1%/10% 
thresholds. 
In order to conduct its feasibility analysis, OSHA surveyed 250 potentially affected 
industries.72 The surveys asked businesses whether they used Cr (VI) as part of normal business 
operations and, if so, what proportion of those operations involved potential chromium exposure. 
Pursuant to these surveys, OSHA identified nine industries where the costs of complying with 
the proposed 5 μg/m3 standard were expected to exceed 1% of revenues, and an additional 
twenty-two where costs were expected to exceed 10% of profits (but revenue loss would be less 
than 1%).73 We list these industries and their projected profit and revenue losses in Table A2 in 
the Appendix. However, OSHA ascertained that nineteen of the thirty-one substantially affected 
industries were “plating or welding industries where actual plating or welding are exceedingly 
rare.”74 As a result, OSHA concluded that it would be improper to extrapolate from the responses 
of one or a few businesses to the entire industry, as it typically does in the course of a feasibility 
analysis.75 Either those businesses were outliers, and the chromium regulation would not 
                                                 
70 See 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10301-10302 (rejecting the more stringent regulation in part due to the fact that the 
electroplating industry would suffer profit losses of approximately 65%). 
71 Id. at 10281. 
72 The federal government classifies industries according to the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), created by OMB to standardize the collection and analysis of industry-wide data. See id. at 10271-79 
(Table VIII-7). For details on the NAICS, see http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/. 
73 Id. at 10300.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 10300-10301. 
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significantly harm the industry, or the business may have checked an incorrect box on OSHA’s 
survey.76 OSHA disregarded the effects of chromium regulation in those cases.77 
 That left twelve industries that OSHA conceded would be affected beyond the 1%/10% 
threshold.78 Even in the face of these twelve violations of its 1%/10% rule, OSHA elected to 
proceed with the regulation. The agency justified its waiver of the 1%/10% standard with respect 
to these industries according to a variety of arguments: 
• In several cases, OSHA decided that demand for the chromium-related product was 
highly inelastic and concluded that affected firms would be able to pass compliance costs 
directly along to consumers, saving the firms from closing. The fact that consumers 
would then bear these costs was not part of the analysis.79 OSHA also did not address 
foreign competition; if foreign firms do not bear the cost of regulation, then domestic 
firms cannot pass on compliance costs to consumers. 
• OSHA classified other industries—typically welding industries geared around machinery 
repair—as primarily “service” industries. It concluded that overseas competition was not 
a real concern for these industries, and thus that demand was relatively inelastic.80 This is 
a non sequitur; demand could certainly be elastic even without direct foreign competition. 
• In other cases, OSHA concluded similarly that the products and services being produced 
were in high demand within the American market or constituted an irreplaceable link in a 
larger market chain.  81 OSHA’s unstated view must have been that demand would be 
relatively inelastic, though here again the possibility of foreign competitors went 
unmentioned. 
• OSHA excepted several industries on the ground that they had recently absorbed profit 
fluctuations or price increases greater than those expected from the new regulation.82 The 
fact that fluctuations in profits are not the same as guaranteed declines in profits was 
apparently lost on the agency. 
• Finally, OSHA excepted several other industries because alternatives to Cr (VI) or 
cheaper emission control technologies existed and could be easily substituted. This 
rationale amounts to a claim that costs were simply not as high as OSHA had estimated in 
its own feasibility analysis.83 
 We summarize these explanations, as applied to the relevant industries, in Table A2 of 
the Appendix, and we provide a sampling of them here. 
 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 10301-302.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 10302.  
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Table 2: Selected Results of OSHA’s Feasibility Analysis 
Industry Compliance 
Costs as a 
Percentage of 
Revenue 
Compliance 
Costs as a 
Percentage of 
Profits 
Explanation of Deviation from Screening 
Electroplating – General Industry 
Electroplating, Plating, 
Polishing Anodizing and 
Coloring Services 
(NAICS 332813) 
1.24% 30.15% Sells service not product, so overseas competition 
shouldn’t be strong. Electroplating is “essential to 
the manufacture of most plated products,” 
implying that demand is unlikely to decrease. 
Experienced and survived profit variation of up to 
49% in single year. 1.24% price increase is 
“significantly less than the average annual increase 
in price.” Demand is inelastic because plating just 
a component of product’s total cost (less than 
0.5%). 
71 Fed. Reg. 10301  
Welding – Construction Industry (Stainless Steel) 
Building, Developing, 
and General 
Contracting; Heavy 
Construction; Special 
Trade Contractors 
(NAICS 233, 234, 235) 
0.92% 22.33% Passing costs on would only increase price 0.92% 
and steel prices have varied more than 10% a year 
without affecting the industry. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Painting – General Industry 
Used Car Dealers 
(NAICS 44112) 
0.41% 33.66% Cr (VI) alternatives already exist, the use of Cr 
(VI) is only a small portion of the actual business, 
and demand is probably fairly inelastic. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Automotive Body, Paint, 
and Interior Repair and 
Maintenance (NAICS 
811121) 
1.50% 39.16% Cr (VI) alternatives are already developed, the use 
of Cr (VI) is only a small portion of the actual 
business, and demand is probably fairly inelastic. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Chromium Catalyst Producers 
All Other Basic 
Inorganic Chemical 
Manufacturers (NAICS 
325188) 
0.80% 27.14% Short-term demand is relatively inelastic since 
most companies would need major new 
investments to shift away from CR(VI) catalysts. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
 
 As an initial matter, it is possible to draw several conclusions from the manner in which 
OSHA conducted this feasibility analysis. First, OSHA’s stated 1%/10% rule operated as only a 
weak constraint. OSHA overrode its general rule in a dozen instances, including several cases in 
which industries were expected to suffer profit losses greater than 20%. These deviations would 
seem a great deal more arbitrary were it not for the arbitrariness of the 1%/10% rule itself. 
OSHA made no serious attempt to justify that standard, nor—more importantly—did it tie it to 
the D.C. Circuit’s standard for feasibility: that the regulation not threaten “the existence or 
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competitive structure of an industry.”84 The ease with which OSHA accepted multiple deviations 
from its 1%/10% rule seems to imply that the agency did not view its own standard as a 
constraint. 
 Second, OSHA’s exceptions to the 1%/10% are neither well reasoned nor well 
documented. OSHA provides little explanation for its broad conclusions about major industries, 
and (as noted above) at certain points its claims seem to skip over important logical links. This is 
in addition to the fact that many of OSHA’s rationales—perhaps all of them—actually amounted 
to claims that profits in an industry would not decrease by the proportion OSHA expected. 
OSHA’s claim that it had excepted industries from the 1%/10% rule is not precisely correct; in 
fact, OSHA simply contravened its own findings. In many cases OSHA may well be correct to 
adjust its own results, but the ease with which standard assessments of lost profits and lost 
revenues were discarded speaks poorly of the reliability of those numbers in the first place. On 
the whole, OSHA’s exceptions have the air of post hoc rationalizations: having decided to 
regulate, OSHA appears to have simply done the paperwork necessary to clear a few formal 
obstacles. 
 Finally, it is entirely conceivable that OSHA’s feasibility analysis led the agency to select 
a suboptimal level of regulation—though not for the reasons that feasibility analysis is typically 
criticized. Industry groups frequently attack feasibility analysis for enabling more stringent 
regulation than they deem appropriate.85 Here, however, feasibility analysis may well have led 
OSHA to opt for too weak a regulatory standard, from a social welfare perspective. On a 
plausible set of assumptions,86 a 1 μg/m3 exposure limit actually produces greater net benefits 
than a 5 μg/m3 exposure limit. Recall that OSHA initially considered setting the exposure limit at 
1 μg/m3, only to discard it in favor of a more relaxed standard in part because a preliminary 
feasibility analysis indicated that at least one industry might suffer losses great enough to 
threaten its survival.87 It is difficult to understand why one or two industries ought to hold 
effective veto rights over a regulation that might substantially benefit workers in numerous other 
segments of the economy, but feasibility analysis—at least as performed by OSHA—invites 
precisely this result. 
 
B. EPA’s Paper Mill Regulation 
 
1. Background 
 
 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills discharge hazardous chemicals into the water and 
hazardous pollutants into the air. The discharges into the water sicken and kill fish and may 
cause harm, including cancer, to humans who eat those fish. The emissions into the air cause 
                                                 
84 United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1272.  
85 This is in many cases a valid criticism, and one we take up in later sections. 
86 Those assumptions are a 3% discount rate and benefits nearer the higher end of the possible range. 
87 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
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cancer, other diseases (such as respiratory disease), unwanted symptoms (such as headaches), 
and bad smells.88 In 1998, EPA issued a new rule that revised and updated earlier rules 
regulating this industry pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act.89 To keep our exposition as simple as possible, we will focus on the effluent limitations—
the regulations governing the discharge of waste into bodies of water. These limitations were 
applied to mills that used a particular wood pulp production process in which wood chips are 
dissolved in caustic soda or sodium sulfide (the bleached papergrade kraft and soda category), 
and to mills that used related sulfite-based processes (the papergrade sulfite category).90 Ninety-
six such mills were in operation in the United States at the time of the regulation.91 
 Under the Clean Water Act, different standards apply to different types of regulated 
activity, depending (for example) on whether a facility existed prior to regulation or not, whether 
discharges are direct or indirect, and the nature and toxicity of the pollutant. In the context of 
paper mill regulation, all of these possibilities arise, and hence EPA in principle was required to 
regulate under multiple standards—best practicable control technology currently available, best 
conventional pollutant control technology, best available technology economically achievable, 
among others—with presumably the strictest prevailing.92 EPA considered three regulatory 
options under the best available technology standard, with the aim of limiting or removing 
chlorine from the production process, of which cancer-causing dioxin and furan are byproducts. 
“Option A” required the mills to substitute chlorine dioxide for elemental chlorine in the 
production process, which reduces but does not eliminate the discharge of dioxin and furan. 
“Option B” was a stricter rule, involving the Option A limits plus delignification (the removal of 
lignin, a material in wood pulp) and other restrictions on the manufacturing process. The effect 
would be to reduce the discharge of dioxin and furan still further but not eliminate it. “Option 
TCF,” stricter still, required the complete elimination of all chlorine from the production process, 
which would eliminate discharge of furan and dioxin.93 
  
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 Pulp mills rarely discharge waste into commercial fisheries. Commercially distributed 
fish caught where waste is discharged are not numerous and are distributed widely, and so 
constitute an insignificant portion of the average consumer’s diet. Accordingly, EPA considered 
only the health effects for recreational and subsistence anglers. Before regulation, between 0.83 
and 2.76 statistical lives were lost per year as a result of the paper mill discharges. Option A 
                                                 
88 Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards for the 
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,585-87 (April 15, 1998). 
89 Id. The regulation was upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). 
90 http://www.insights.co.nz/products_processes_pp.aspx.  
91 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,505. 
92 See id. at 18,513-14. 
93 Id. at 18,541-43. 
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would reduce annual statistical deaths by 0.73-2.41, and Option B would reduce annual statistical 
deaths by 0.75-2.50. To monetize these figures, EPA used very broad ranges for the value of a 
statistical life (between $2.5 and $9 million). The highest possible benefit was accordingly $21.7 
million per year under Option A and $22.5 million per year under Option B.94 In a separate 
“sensitivity analysis,” EPA estimated that Option TCF would reduce statistical cancer deaths by 
0.83 to 2.76 per year—thus eliminating the entire pre-regulation risk of death—providing a 
potential benefit of up to $25.2 million.95 
 EPA also stated that the regulations would reduce risk of non-cancer illnesses but (like 
OSHA) did not report monetary estimates because of inadequate data.96 Further, by reducing the 
amount of dioxin in fisheries, the regulations would reduce the number of dioxin-related fish 
advisories and hence would increase the number of anglers who would be able to use those 
fisheries. EPA valued this benefit at $2 to $20 million per year for both Option A and Option 
B.97 Increased participation of anglers would add another $4.7 to $15.5 million per year, but 
because of uncertainties EPA did not end up including these figures in its benefit estimate.98 
Finally, the ability to use cheaper sludge disposal methods would save another $8 to $16 million 
per year.99 Option TCF would have the same effect.100 Aggregate benefits were $11.9-$57.1 
million for Option A, $12-$57.9 million for Option B,101 and $12.1-$60.6 million for Option 
TCF.102 
 EPA estimated compliance costs of approximately $262 million per year for Option A, 
$324 million for Option B, and $1.01 billion for Option TCF.103 It did not calculate aggregate 
present values for the benefits and costs for each option,104 but quite clearly they were negative, 
especially because capital costs would occur in the near term and many of the benefits, such as 
avoided cancer deaths, would be enjoyed only in the long term. Of the three options, Option A is 
the least bad, reducing social wealth by, on average, only about $200 million per year (assuming 
benefits at the maximum of the range). 
 The effluent regulation is not the whole story, however. As noted earlier, the rule 
combined both effluent and emission regulations under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, 
and the EPA integrated the cost-benefit analyses of both sets of regulations. The reason for this is 
that Options B and TCF would produce hazardous emissions that would require further controls 
                                                 
94 Economic Analysis, Table 8-6. The normal value of life is $6 million. EPA also calculated the effect of the 
options on the Native American angler population but because the numbers are so small and uncertain, and EPA 
omitted them from its analysis. See id. at p. 8-14.  
95 Id. at p. 8-45. 
96 Id. at p. 8-14. 
97 Id. at p. 8-23; Table 8-12. 
98 Id. at p. 8-23; Table 8-12. 
99 Id. at p. 8-25. 
100 Id. at p. 8-45. 
101 Id. at Table 8-12. 
102 Id. at Table 8-21. 
103 Id. at Tables 5-16, 5-18. 
104 EPA does report present values for the integrated rules, including emissions limitations. See Table 10-2. 
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under the Clean Air Act. The combined annual benefits for Option A ranged between –$727 
million [sic]105 and $1.5 billion, while the combined annual costs were $420 million—more or 
less a wash if we take the midpoint of the benefits. Table 3 provides a summary of the analysis. 
 
Table 3: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Costs and Benefits of Options106 
 
Rules 
Option A 
Final Rule 
Option B 
Alternate Rule #1 
Option TCF 
Alternate Rule #2 
Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule 
Capital Costs $1,039 $1, 394 $2,203 $2,694 $3,159 $3,650 
Operation and 
Management Costs  
$158 $211 $94 $163 $790 $859 
Pre-Tax Annualized 
Costs 
$263 $351 $324 $442 $1,096 $1,215 
Total Annual 
Monetized Benefits 
$11.9 - $57.1 
($738.5) - 
$1,496 
$12.0 - $57.9 
($738.4) - 
$1,496 
$12.1 - $60.6 
($738.3) - 
$1,497 
Net Benefits  ($250.9) - 
($205.7) 
($1,090) - 
$1,144 
($312.0) - 
(266.1) 
($1,181) - 
$1,054 
($1,084) - 
($1.0359) 
($1,953) - 
$282.1 
Note: All dollar amounts are in millions of 1995 dollars. Amounts that are surrounded by parentheses are negative. 
EPA used a 7% discount rate in all of their calculations. Costs were probably annualized over a 30 year period, with 
capital costs being double counted in both the first and twenty-first years, and annual operation and management 
costs counted every year after the first.  
 
3. Feasibility Analysis 
 
 EPA did not explicitly refer to feasibility analysis, but it conducted what it called an 
analysis of “economic impact” that resembles OSHA’s feasibility analysis for the chromium 
rule, albeit without the compliance thresholds. 
 First, EPA examined mill closures. Ninety-six mills would be affected by the regulation. 
Of these, one would be closed under Option A, two under Option B, and seven under Option 
TCF.107 EPA made these estimates on the basis of accounting data reported by the firms. If the 
cost of compliance would be greater than the profits generated by a particular mill, then that mill 
would close. OSHA, by contrast, looked directly at the impact on profits. 
 Second, EPA examined job loss. The industry employed 90,840 workers. EPA estimated 
that 400 jobs would be lost under Option A, 900 under Option B, and 7,100 under Option 
                                                 
105 Negative benefits are possible because the emissions regulation replaces some hazardous emissions with other 
hazardous emissions; under certain conditions, the latter emissions could cause more harm. Id. at 4-7. 
106 This table is compiled from data in the EPA's regulatory impact analysis for the National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category; Final Rule, 
63 Fed. Reg. 18504, pages 3-2, 4-23, and Tables 5-16, 5-18, 8-12, 8-13, and 8-21. 
107 Economic Analysis, Table 6-4, 6-19. 
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TCF.108 These jobs refer to those of workers in firms that would be shut down. EPA also noted 
that 5,700 jobs would be lost in aggregate under Option A—including job losses in mills that are 
not shut down but suffer a loss in demand—but did not provide comparable figures for Options 
B and TCF.109 
 Third, EPA considered bankruptcies of firms. Thirty-seven firms would be affected by 
the regulation. EPA estimated that no publicly owned firms would be bankrupted under Option 
A, and more than one would be bankrupted under Options B. The estimate was based on an 
algorithm that uses accounting data as inputs and generates a probability that the firm will enter 
bankruptcy. EPA did not perform this analysis for Option TCF but reasoned that it would 
bankrupt at least as many firms as Option B.110 
  As noted, EPA, unlike OSHA, did not set a compliance threshold for revenue or 
profit loss, or plant closings in general. It simply reported this information without comment. 
Table 4 provides a summary. Table 4 also includes the feasibility analysis for the integrated 
regulation that includes emissions standards. These standards applied to a greater number of 
mills, jobs, and firms, and those figures are included in the table. 
 
Table 4: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Economic Impacts of Options111 
 
 
Rules 
Option A 
Final Rule 
Option B 
Alternate Rule #1 
Option TCF 
Alternate Rule #2 
Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule Individually 
w/CAA 
Rule 
Mill Closures / Mills 1/96 2/158 2/96  4/158  7/96 9/158  
Job Losses from Mill 
Closures 
Baseline: 90,840  
400  900  900  4,800  7,100 10,200  
Firm Failures / Firms 0/37 0/52  >1/37  >1/52  >1/37 >1/52  
 
 EPA concluded on the basis of this analysis that Option A was “economically 
achievable,” and that Option B and Option TCF were not.112 
 The question, then, is why Option A satisfied the feasibility test. Is it because a regulation 
that causes the closure of only one of 96 mills is “feasible”? Or is the relevant issue job loss or 
bankruptcy? And where is the line to be drawn? EPA said that seven mill closures and 7,100 job 
losses made Option TCF infeasible without considering firm failures.113 What if these numbers 
                                                 
108 Id. at Table 6-4, 6-19. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 6-6. 
111 This table is compiled from data in the EPA's regulatory impact analysis for the National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category; Final Rule, 
63 Fed. Reg. 18504, pages 2-3, 2-29, and 6-4 to -6, and Tables 6-4, 6-5, and 6-19. 
112 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,550, 18,584. However, Option B was chosen for new sources. 
113 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,584. 
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were incrementally lower? More puzzles arise when one considers the integrated regulation 
options. Now Option A shuts down two mills and eliminates 900 jobs. How does one determine 
whether these extra harms are justified by the additional benefits from the emissions limits? In 
addition, mill closures (2) and job losses (900) are the same under the unachievable Option B by 
itself and the integrated Option A. The only difference is the lack of firm failure. EPA said that 
failures are “particularly problematic,”114 but did not elaborate. In addition, EPA has issued other 
rules despite the fact that they caused firm failures.115 Does it matter what size the firm is? 
Shouldn’t it matter? Since mills employ different numbers of worker (400 at the most vulnerable 
mill, 500 at the second most, and then 3,900 at the third and fourth most vulnerable mills 
combined, or 1,900 at each on average), a larger mill could easily employ more workers and 
produce more paper than a smaller firm. 
 Whatever feasibility analysis’s ambiguities, it is clear about one thing: losses to consumer 
welfare do not play a role in the test. Because EPA nonetheless performed an analysis of the 
effect of the rules, we can see the consequence of this approach. EPA estimated that Option A 
would increase the cost of paper products for people with incomes under $10,000 from 2.09 to 
2.13 percent of pre-tax income, in aggregate $26.1 million.116 The losses to the general public 
would be much higher, of course, as reflected in the cost-benefit analysis—although, ideally, a 
cost-benefit analysis would also monetize the benefits that EPA omitted. 
 
III. The Problems With Feasibility Analysis 
 
A. The Economic Consequences of Feasibility Analysis 
 
1. A Framework 
 
 As we have noted, feasibility analysis comes in different formulations. We will focus on 
OSHA’s because of its precision, but our analysis applies to others as well, and we will briefly 
address EPA’s approach. OSHA’s feasibility analysis proceeds as follows: 
 
1. Identify a workplace that is unsafe.117 
2. Define the relevant industry or industries. 
3. Determine the technologically feasible (that is, available) measures that can reduce or 
eliminate the risk.  
                                                 
114 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,550 
115 See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and 
New Source Performance Standards; Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 50,388, 50,406 
116 Economic Analysis, at 8-43. 
117 Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (“[OSHA] is required 
to make a threshold finding that a place of employment is unsafe—in the sense that significant risks are present and 
can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices.”). 
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4. Require firms in the industry to adopt these measures unless the cost of doing so would 
cause widespread plant closings or (in OSHA’s formulation) 
  a. Reduce industry profits by more than ten percent; or 
  b. Reduce industry revenues by more than one percent. 
Analysts refer to step 3 as the technological feasibility requirement and step 4 as the economic 
feasibility requirement. Step 1 is straightforward; we evaluate steps 2 through 4 below. 
 
2. Industry 
 
 Feasibility analysis requires some definition of industry because the technological 
feasibility requirement typically refers to technologies used in the industry being regulated, and 
the economic feasibility requirement refers to plant closings within that industry. But how is the 
relevant industry determined? We have had trouble finding an answer to this question in the 
regulations and case law, but we can at least explain why the definition of industry matters, and 
what is at stake. 
 Imagine that substance X causes harm to workers who are exposed to it. Industry 1 uses 
substance X to paint cars. Industry 2 uses substance X to paint aircraft. A technologically 
feasible regulation would require employers to supply workers with respirators at the cost of 
(say) $500 per worker. 
 It is easy to see that this identical regulation might cause widespread plant closing in one 
industry but not another. Industry 1 (let us suppose) faces elastic demand. If firms supply 
respirators and raise prices, they lose customers. Plants that had been justified by economies of 
scale are shut down and workers lose jobs. Industry 2 faces inelastic demand. Firms pass on the 
costs to consumers and demand remains constant. No plants close. 
 If Industries 1 and 2 are treated separately for purpose of feasibility analysis, then 
regulations will mandate respirators only in Industry 2, not in Industry 1. If Industries 1 and 2 are 
treated as the same industry—the industrial consumer-products painting industry—then the 
agency would need to determine whether the respirator rule would cause widespread plant 
closures in the whole industry that combines 1 and 2. Using OSHA’s chromium approach, this 
would involve determining whether the regulation reduces revenues by one percent and profits 
by ten percent for the joint industry. If so, the respirator rule is imposed, and car-painting plants 
are shut down. If not, the respirator rule is not imposed. It is clear that whether respirators are 
used thus depends on a rather arbitrary notion of how broadly the industry is defined. 
 Industries do not come in natural kinds. Any industry can be subdivided indefinitely. In 
our Industry 1, closer examination might reveal that some firms paint cars and boats, while other 
firms paint only cars. The firms in each sub-industry could have different cost structures, so that 
if we applied the feasibility test to each sub-industry, one sub-industry would pass the test and 
the other would not. Then it could turn out that, among firms that paint cars and boats, some 
provide high-end work, while others provide low-end work; some do custom work, while others 
do mass-produced work; some serve a particular region; some export and others do not; and so 
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on, until each firm belongs to its own “industry.” Feasibility analysis would then simply require 
firms that are large (their revenues are high) and profitable to adopt the safety precautions, while 
smaller and poorer firms would not. 
 One might try to define industry in light of the purpose of feasibility analysis. But it is not 
clear what the purpose of that test is. If the purpose is to permit regulation up to the point of 
significant job loss, then one should not use an industry definition at all. The relevant 
consideration would be the total number of lost jobs, regardless of which industry from which 
they disappear. Another possible purpose is to protect workers with industry-specific skills—
skills that can be applied to one type of production process and not others. Workers with such 
skills who lose their jobs may not be able to find jobs in another industry. On this theory, plant 
shutdowns scattered across industries are less troublesome than those concentrated in a single 
industry, even if the total number of jobs lost is the same. If this is the purpose of feasibility 
analysis, then industries should be defined with reference to the transferability of skills. Another 
possible purpose is to avoid substantial job losses in a single region, on the theory that workers 
are not highly geographically mobile. If this is the purpose of feasibility analysis, then industries 
should be defined with reference to geography. 
 That is not how agencies define industries. Instead, they use the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).118 The Office of Management and Budget developed NAICS in 
order to regularize statistical reporting by government agencies. NAICS divides industries into 
more than a thousand six-digit codes. Classification is based on the similarity of production 
processes.119 Consider the following example:120 
333311  Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing  
333312  Commercial Laundry, Drycleaning, and Pressing Machine Manufacturing  
333313  Office Machinery Manufacturing  
333314  Optical Instrument and Lens Manufacturing  
333315  Photographic and Photocopying Equipment Manufacturing  
333319  Other Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing 
A firm that manufacturers vending machines and a firm that manufactures pressing machines 
belong to different industries because the production processes are different. A firm that 
manufacturers computers and a firm that manufactures fax machines belong to the same industry 
because their production processes are similar. But the similarity or difference of production 
processes is not the same thing as the substitutability of jobs. An assembly-line worker, or 
custodian, or security guard could probably work in any of these firms. And of course these 
classifications say essentially nothing about geography. Another government classification 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10337 (OSHA); 67 Fed. Reg. 3370, 3370 (EPA). 
119 See http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q1.  
120 Taken from U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definition, available at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart_code=31&search=2007%20NAICS%20Search.  
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system divides up occupations according to their similarity, but agencies do not use that 
system.121 
 This is a problem if the purpose of economic feasibility is to prevent regulations from 
harming workers by eliminating their jobs. A regulation that completely eliminated office 
machinery manufacturing would have little impact on employment if workers can easily find 
jobs in other commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing. Accordingly, the fact of 
widespread plant closures in an industry reveals little about the regulation’s impact on workers. 
 Agencies appear to be aware of this problem, which they address by tinkering with 
industry classifications on an ad hoc basis.122 This means that whether a regulation turns out to 
be economically feasible or not is essentially a discretionary judgment by the agency. 
 It is worth noting that agencies may elect to alter (or scrap) a regulation entirely rather 
than exempt certain industries from otherwise general rules. For instance, if a regulation as 
applied to some industry would be infeasible per OSHA’s 1%/10% rule, OSHA may elect to 
either except that industry from the 1%/10% rule and apply the regulation anyway or scrap the 
regulation. This is effectively what happened in the chromium case: the 1 microgram standard 
looked as though it would do too much damage to one industry, so OSHA scrapped it in favor of 
a 5 micro-gram standard and then applied that standard to all industries despite the fact that some 
of them almost certainly would not suffer substantial revenue or profit loss under the 1 
microgram standard. Infeasibility in one industry may act as an effective veto of regulation of 
other industries. 
 
3. Technological Feasibility 
 
 Technological feasibility generally means technological availability. For example, 
suppose that industrial practices cause certain inhalable toxins to enter the air. The agency may 
consider ordering firms to adopt measures that are already technologically possible—for 
example, ventilation fans or respirators that are already used by firms (though not necessarily 
those in the industry).123 Although some commentators believe that agencies may issue 
“technology-forcing” regulations—regulations that oblige firms to develop new, more effective 
technologies—in practice courts have placed a heavy burden on agencies to prove that such 
                                                 
121 http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q19.  
122 See 71 Fed. Reg. at 10226 (using “application groups” to group “firms where employees are exposed…when 
performing a particular function” since similar control technologies would be appropriate within the group); 63 Fed. 
Reg. 18504, 18504 (revising subcategorization scheme to better reflect the actual processes used).  
123 The literature has dwelt on the ambiguity of this term. A safety measure that is cheap in one type of plant may be 
a little or a great deal more expensive in another type of plant because of differences in the physical configurations 
of the plants. As others have discussed this issue in detail, we will ignore it. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard 
B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envt’l L. 171 
(1988). 
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technologies can indeed be developed, and as a result agencies rarely issue technology-forcing 
regulations.124 
 Thus, the relevant “cost” for purposes of determining economic feasibility is the cost of 
adopting available technology for the purpose of reducing or eliminating a risk. Presumably, the 
most restrictive technology must be used, consistent only with economic feasibility. An agency 
can also reduce the risk to zero simply by banning the production process that causes the risk. 
For example, if a toxin is used in painting cars, the agency could order the firm not to use the 
toxin—again subject to the economic feasibility rule. Option TCF (“totally chlorine free”) for the 
paper mill regulation did just this.  
 The consequence is that the agency must choose between mandating safety precautions 
that already exist or banning the substance altogether. But banning the substance altogether 
would always be worse than demanding technological innovation that renders it harmless, given 
that firms would always retain the option of discontinuing use of the substance if such innovation 
would be too expensive. 
 The effect of the technological feasibility condition is not only to protect firms from 
regulations that might drive them out of business (because they cannot develop a new technology 
in cost-justified fashion), but also to entrench old technologies.125 Although feasibility analysis 
does not eliminate firms’ existing incentives to develop safety precautions that are cheaper than, 
but just as effective as, existing safety precautions, it does not enhance these incentives. The 
reason is that feasibility analysis gives firms no incentive to take into account the costs they 
impose on third parties. In fact, firms have incentives to avoid developing new technologies. 
Newer, more effective technologies might make otherwise infeasible regulations feasible, 
allowing agencies to impose additional regulation. 
 
4. Economic Feasibility 
 
 In OSHA’s formulation, economic feasibility exists when two conditions are satisfied: 
the cost of the safety technology is less than ten percent of profits, and the cost is less than one 
percent of revenues. Commentators have generally interpreted feasibility in terms of plant 
closures, which were also the focus of EPA’s paper mill regulation. We will address each of 
these approaches. 
 Revenues. It is straightforward that the revenue component of the feasibility rule 
introduces a market distortion in favor of small firms, that is, firms with low revenues, compared 
                                                 
124 Driesen, supra note 19, at 13-15. Many feasibility-triggering statutes explicitly require “available” or 
“demonstrated” technology, and courts have interpreted this language to mean that it has already been tested and 
approved for use. 
125 Sometimes agencies will accompany feasibility-based regulations with other regulations that provide incentives 
for innovation. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. at 18,593-608 (Voluntary Advanced Technology Incentives Program in paper 
mills). In addition, there are some recent examples of agencies picking control technologies that have only been 
adopted in a few facilities and the courts supporting their choice. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 
983-84 (D.C. Cir.1991) (approving OSHA’s feasibility determination based on evidence that a single company was 
able to meet the standard). 
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to large firms.126 To see why, suppose that the technologically feasible safety precaution in the 
car-painting industry is the installation of a ventilation system. Suppose that one firm does high-
end work, with high revenues and high costs, and another firm does low-end work, with low 
revenues and low costs—but are otherwise identical. Suppose that the first firm has revenues of 
$10 million and the second firm has revenues of $1 million, and that the ventilation system costs 
$50,000. If the firms are defined as belonging to different industries, then only the first firm must 
install the ventilation system. If the firms are defined as belonging to the same industry, then 
both firms must either install the system or not install the system, depending on the overall cost 
structure of the industry. Yet there is no reason to make the ventilation system depend on the size 
of the firm. 
 Firms become large to exploit economies of scale. A rule that systematically disfavors 
large firms discourages firms from becoming large in the first place. The loss of economies of 
scale will drive up costs, hurting consumers and shareholders, without producing any offsetting 
benefits. 
 It is possible that, in some industries, the revenue rule is harmless because the costs of 
safety precautions increase with revenue. Suppose, for example, that the technologically feasible 
precaution is for workers to use respirators, and that higher revenue firms have more workers. In 
this case, the revenue rule does not create an inefficiency because larger firms do not suffer 
relative to small firms. However, there is no reason to believe this relationship holds in all cases. 
 Profits. The profit component of the economic feasibility rule protects low-profit 
industries from regulation. To understand the economic effect of such a rule, we need to 
understand why some industries enjoy higher profits than others. There are a few possibilities. 
First, the higher-profit industry might face a higher level of risk, and investors demand the higher 
profits to compensate them for taking on this extra level of risk. If this is the case, then 
regulations that disfavor higher-profit firms will simply reduce their profits and cause investors 
to flee. Despite the apparent small impact of the regulation on profits (that is, less than ten 
percent), firms will close or otherwise reduce their risk-taking activity. The effect will be felt as 
lower returns for shareholders in the short run, but as higher costs for consumers or the 
elimination of desirable goods in the long run. 
 Second, some firms enjoy short-term profits because their managers spot market 
opportunities that competitors miss. The short-term profits thus serve as a signal of unexploited 
demand, attracting capital and eventually driving down prices, to the benefit of consumers. The 
profit rule is simply a tax on such profits, which will reduce incentives to exploit these 
opportunities. Consumers lose as a result. 
 Third, the higher-profit industry may benefit from natural or artificial market restrictions, 
such as economies of scale, regulations, or illegal anticompetitive behavior. In the last case, the 
                                                 
126 Note also that “under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amendent by [the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA)], EPA generally is required to conduct a 
regulatory flexibility analysis describing the impact of the rule on small entities.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 18611. In other 
words RFA requires a separate analysis of small businesses. In some OSHA regulations, it has used a 1%/5% limit 
for small businesses instead of the 1%/10% threshold. 71 Fed. Reg. 50122, 50157; 69 Fed. Reg. 55668, 55701.  
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profit rule will reduce the profits of firms without having any negative effect, assuming that the 
rents enjoyed by investors are greater than one percent of the total return. At the same time, the 
profit rule may interact in undesirable ways with other areas of the law. Intellectual property law 
grants firms limited monopolies in order to encourage innovation, yet these firms become 
vulnerable under the feasibility test. Antitrust law is the proper method for policing 
anticompetitive behavior; a rule that generally penalizes high-profit firms would be in tension 
with antitrust law’s more nuanced approach. 
 Plants, Jobs, and Firms. Why does OSHA consider revenues and profits? An alternative 
approach, illustrated by EPA’s paper mill regulation, is to determine whether a regulation closes 
plants, destroys jobs, or bankrupts firms. Scholarly defenders of feasibility analysis also focus on 
plant closures, job losses, and bankruptcies.127 Which is the right standard for feasibility? 
 These standards are obviously not the same. A regulation that reduces the revenues of an 
industry does not necessarily reduce its profits. The regulation could cause some firms to shut 
down, resulting in greater business for other firms and generating rents for them in the short run. 
A regulation could also reduce profits without reducing revenues just by increasing costs. OSHA 
requires both conditions to be satisfied, but why exactly? What is so important about revenues 
and profits? One might think that OSHA seeks to protect the capitalists, not the workers. 
 Revenues and profits could be proxies for plant shutdowns. If revenues and profits 
decline, then plants may be shut down and jobs lost. But revenues and profits could decline 
without any plants being shut down: the regulation could just cause firms to fire workers while 
keeping plants open with smaller staffs. In any event, why use proxies if the real concern is plant 
closings or job loss? Agencies can estimate these outcomes directly—EPA did just this in the 
paper mill regulation—and evaluate regulations’ feasibility on the basis of them. 
 But plant closures and job loss are not the same thing, either. A regulation that causes 
plant closures could have no effect on job loss if firms just reassign workers to plants that remain 
open. Or consider a regulation that shuts one out of 50 plants, with the result that 100 jobs are 
lost, and a regulation that shuts zero plants but causes 10 job losses in all 50 plants, for a total of 
500 job losses. Should the agency focus on plant closings (perhaps because of the effect on the 
community) or job losses (because in the end this is what matters)? Workers are harmed when 
they lose jobs, and people in the surrounding community could be hurt if job losses are 
concentrated in one plant. Plant closings might be thought of as a proxy for job losses, but 
agencies are capable of estimating job losses directly; EPA did this as well. There is no need to 
employ any sort of proxy. 
 Finally, should agencies instead interpret feasibility to refer to bankruptcies? Consider an 
industry with 50 plants. One firm owns 49 plants and another firm owns one plant. If a regulation 
bankrupts the first firm, the consequences might seem more serious than if it bankrupts the 
second firm, because the first firm owns more plants. On the other hand, bankruptcy does not 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 10 (arguing that avoiding plant closures and unemployment should be the only 
countervailing consideration to health and safety under feasibility analysis). 
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force firms to shut down plants they own. If the plants remain profitable, the firms will just sell 
them, and no one will lose a job. If that is the case, why restrict regulation to avoid bankruptcy? 
 These different rules would cause firms to act in different ways, none good. If firms 
anticipate that agencies will spare them from regulation when necessary to minimize plant 
shutdowns, then they will invest in larger numbers of smaller plants. If agencies spare firms 
when necessary to minimize bankruptcy, then firms will maintain thin capitalizations by 
distributing dividends to a greater extent than they would otherwise. If agencies spare firms 
when necessary to minimize job loss, then firms will overhire. Of course, if the regulations have 
only limited effect, then these distortions will be only marginal, but by the same token the 
regulations will do little good. 
 Path-Dependency and Time-Inconsistency. Suppose that an industry produces hazardous 
emissions that kill ten people per year. The industry has revenues of $1 million, costs of 
$900,000, and profits of $100,000. Under some versions of the feasibility approach, EPA should 
choose a level of regulation that reduces emissions to the maximum extent consistent with 
avoiding widespread plant shutdowns or bankruptcies. Let us stipulate that a regulation X that 
costs $90,000 would save 9 lives and avoid shutdowns and bankruptcies, leaving the industry as 
a whole with profits of $10,000. 
 Next year, scientists discover that this same industry emits another hazardous substance. 
This substance kills 100 people per year. A regulation Y that costs $50,000 would save 99 of 
these people but would also bankrupt the industry, which now has profits of only $10,000. 
Accordingly, feasibility analysis would forbid the agency from promulgating this regulation. 
 If scientists had discovered the second substance first, EPA could have issued regulation 
Y, which saves more people at lower cost than regulation X does. This path dependence reflects 
another form of arbitrariness that feasibility analysis produces. By contrast, cost-benefit analysis 
would require either or both regulations to be issued, regardless of the order in which they are 
introduced, as long as they are cost-justified (and regardless of whether they bankrupt the 
industry).128 
 Agencies can reduce the risk of path dependency by refusing to issue regulations that 
consume a large portion of an industry’s profits. As we have seen, OSHA will not issue 
regulations that reduce profits by more than ten percent. In this case, path dependence will result 
only if OSHA issues at least nine regulations that amount to more than ninety percent of profits. 
But the price of avoiding the risk of path dependence is high. OSHA must refrain from issuing 
cost-justified regulations that produce high costs but even higher benefits. 
 
5. Summary 
 
 We can put the pieces of our analysis together. According to economic analysis, a firm 
should engage in a precaution when the marginal benefits (in terms of reduced risk of harm to 
                                                 
128 Path dependency could be introduced if the cost-benefit analysis takes into account the hardship from job loss; 
however, as noted earlier, these costs are generally ignored for largely sensible reasons. 
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workers and others) exceed the marginal costs. Feasibility analysis deviates from this approach. 
We can divide the deviations into two categories—cases where feasibility analysis results in 
underregulation (relative to economic optimality) and cases where it results in overregulation.129 
As before, we focus on OSHA’s approach. 
 
 Feasibility analysis results in underregulation of industrial sectors where: 
• A low-cost precaution technology can be cheaply developed but does not currently exist; 
• The industry has low revenues or precaution costs do not increase with revenue; or 
• The industry has low profits. 
 
 Feasibility analysis results in overregulation of industrial sectors where: 
• The technologically feasible regulation creates costs greater than the benefits from risk 
reduction; and 
• The industry has high revenues, precaution costs increase with revenue, or the industry 
has high profits. 
 
 Further, the constraint that requires agencies to choose between banning a substance or 
activity, or imposing a technologically feasible precaution, prevents agencies from requiring 
optimal technological innovation. And the industry-level analysis creates further distortions. If 
the technologically feasible regulation is also economically optimal, then a narrow definition of 
industry (down to the firm level) inefficiently spares low-revenue and low-profit firms while a 
broad definition inefficiently spares all firms in low-revenue and low-profit “industries.” Finally, 
feasibility analysis is path-dependent and can result in underregulation if more hazardous 
activities are discovered after regulations addressing less hazardous activities are issued. 
 Under EPA’s approach, other distortions occur. A cost-justified regulation that shuts 
down plants, causes job loss, or sends firms into bankruptcy is barred, and a regulation that 
excessively reduces risks and hence harms consumers but does not have these other effects is 
permitted. 
 We should immediately note that one might defend feasibility analysis on grounds other 
than those of welfare economics. It might seem too obvious to state that any decision-procedure 
other than cost-benefit analysis will promote social welfare less well than cost-benefit analysis 
does. But matters are considerably more complicated than this. 
 Initially, it is important to be clear about how feasibility analysis deviates from cost-
benefit analysis. If these differences seem intuitively appropriate, then we might believe that 
these deviations are justified. As we will see, defenders of feasibility analysis believe that one 
advantage is that it focuses on plant closures—which can cause concentrated hardship—whereas 
cost-benefit analysis ignores them. 
                                                 
129 Others have noted that feasibility analysis leads to over- and underregulation relative to cost-benefit analysis; see, 
e.g., Farber, supra note 10, at 78; LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 14-15 (1981). 
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 Further, we might agree that social welfare maximization is the appropriate normative 
goal, and argue about whether cost-benefit analysis or feasibility analysis is the better decision-
procedure for obtaining that goal. Cost-benefit analysis is an imperfect decision-procedure; 
feasibility analysis might be better. Indeed, defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument. 
 Finally, we might instead reject social welfare maximization as the goal and argue that 
agencies should pursue some other normative goal that feasibility analysis happens to promote. 
Defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument as well. 
 We turn to these arguments in the next sections. 
 
B. Feasibility Analysis as a Welfarist Decision-Procedure 
 
 Feasibility analysis is a decision-procedure—that is, an instrument or means that agencies 
use for the purpose of achieving a normative goal.130 The normative goal itself might be reflected 
in the statute or, if the statute is ambiguous, in the policy of the agency or the executive branch. 
Let us first suppose that the relevant statute or policy sets the goal of advancing social welfare. 
 A decision procedure is just a type of rule. Rules (compared to standards) reduce decision 
costs but raise error costs.131 The choice between rules and standards depends on the tradeoff 
between these costs. In the current setting, agencies could be asked to apply a standard—
maximize social welfare—but most people agree that such a standard provides inadequate 
guidance, thus generating high decision costs. The literature discusses various rule-like 
procedures that reduce decision costs, including cost-benefit analysis, QALY analysis, risk-risk 
analysis, and feasibility analysis.132 Cost-benefit analysis is a “wide” rule that allows the analyst 
to take into account a range of costs that regulations impose on people.133 Risk-risk analysis, by 
contrast, is narrower: it considers only the effects on lives. Social welfare maximization favors 
wider approaches, to the extent that decision costs can be minimized, because people’s welfare 
depends on a range of activities and conditions, not just (for example) the bare fact of being 
alive. At the same time, cost-benefit analysis minimizes decision costs through the magic of 
quantification. Once valuations are obtained from the marketplace and surveys—fixed costs that 
can be spread across multiple regulations—decisions are relatively automatic. Judgment must be 
used, but standard procedures have developed, which improves monitoring and thus limits 
bias.134 
 The idea that feasibility analysis is a welfarist decision-procedure—that it is justified 
because it promotes well-being more effectively than cost-benefit analysis or any other decision-
                                                 
130 For a discussion of decision-procedures in this context, see Adler & Posner, supra note 8, at 63-68. 
131 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (describing a general theory of rules and 
standards). 
132 Adler & Posner, supra note 8, at 63-68. 
133 We refer to cost-benefit analysis as ordinarily practiced, which assumes the standard economic welfarist 
approach—subjective preference satisfaction—but in practice ignores certain other-regarding preferences. See Adler 
& Posner, supra note 8, for a discussion. 
134 We will discuss bias in Part III.D. 
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procedure does—is not fanciful. David Driesen, the leading defender of feasibility analysis, 
appears to take this view, or at least certain elements of his defense are consistent with this view. 
In particular, he stresses three welfarist virtues of feasibility analysis: that it ensures that agencies 
regulate industrial processes that create harms that are difficult to monetize; that it ensures that 
regulation does not impose concentrated harms on workers and spreads the costs of regulation 
among consumers; and that it provides clear guidance for agencies, thus avoiding arbitrary and 
inconsistent regulatory outcomes. 135 Let us consider these arguments in turn. 
 Difficulties with monetization. Various substances used in industrial processes cause 
harm to humans. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to quantify and monetize those harms. 
Regulators may suspect that a substance harms humans because it causes cancer in animals but 
lack epidemiological proof that the substance also causes cancer in humans. Regulators might 
have evidence that the substance harms some people (for example, cigarette smokers) and might 
believe, based on experience, that such a substance will be generally harmful, but lack evidence 
that it causes harm to other people. And even when it is clear that substances cause harms, many 
harms are difficult to monetize. Some substances might cause bad odors or unsightly air 
pollution that does not cause harm to health but bothers people; it is not easy to monetize these 
harms.136 Medical costs can be used when the condition is curable, but many conditions are 
chronic and bothersome but not deadly; how does one attach a money value to these 
experiences? And what if rich people and poor people are affected by the same hazard: should 
the well-being of the rich count more because they are willing to pay a higher amount (by virtue 
of their wealth alone) to avoid it? Finally, there is the vexed question of valuing avoided 
deaths.137 
 Cost-benefit analysts have struggled with these problems and proposed a range of 
imaginative methods for estimating and monetizing harms.138 But many critics of cost-benefit 
analysis believe that these estimates are arbitrary or too low, and that the burden of collecting 
and analyzing data builds in an unjustified anti-regulatory bias. The chromium and paper mill 
regulations were typical in this regard. OSHA believed that exposure to chromium causes 
asthma, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal ulcers but did not include these harms in its cost-
benefit analysis because of data limitations.139 EPA believed that paper mill discharges cause 
various non-cancer illnesses but did not include these harms for the same reason.140 Feasibility 
analysis avoids this problem by starting with the assumption that known risks of harm should be 
reduced as far as possible, consistent with technological and economic feasibility. Although one 
                                                 
135 Driesen, supra note 10, at 34-41. 
136 EPA’s grand canyon regulation. 
137 Many of these criticisms originated in Kelman, supra note 9; for a recent compilation, see Ackerman & 
Heinzerling, supra note 9. 
138 See, e.g., CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed. 1993); W. KIP VISCUSI, 
FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, 
The Value of Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003). 
139 See Part II.A., supra. 
140 See Part II.B., supra. 
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must identify harmful substances—so, again, lack of available data could still hinder 
regulations—once one has done this, it is not necessary to calculate precise risks and to monetize 
harms. 
 This advantage of feasibility analysis, however, comes at a significant cost. If there were 
no technological and economic feasibility constraint, feasibility analysis would require agencies 
to reduce all risks of harm to zero. Virtually all industrial practices create risks of harm for 
workers and for other people exposed to a firm’s pollution. Any serious effort to reduce risks to 
zero would require shutting down the economy (in the process no doubt making life less healthy 
and more dangerous).141 Feasibility analysis avoids this outcome by stipulating that the economy 
should not be shut down. But it does not explain how far regulation should go: at what point 
should we regard suppression of economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that 
reduces risk? 
 As we have seen, the agencies have failed to answer this question. OSHA’s approach in 
the chromium regulation is clearly arbitrary, but that is only because it is so specific; any similar 
approach that refers more vaguely to avoiding plant closings is equally arbitrary. A regulation 
that substantially reduces risks of harm should be issued even if it closes many plants. A 
regulation that reduces risks of harm very little, while imposing very high costs on consumers, 
should not be issued even if it doesn’t close any plants.  
 A further point is that if the problem with cost-benefit analysis is that it ignores real 
harms (as opposed to harms for which there is no evidence because they do not exist), then 
multipliers and other simple devices can be used to improve analysis. The government could 
conduct periodic retrospective studies of regulations to see whether the cost-benefit analyses that 
justified them turned out to be accurate.142 If these retrospective studies reveal that cost-benefit 
analysis systematically underestimates the benefits of regulation by (say) a factor of two, then 
agencies should be directed to multiply their estimates of benefits by two whenever they conduct 
cost-benefit analysis for new regulations. 
 Plant closings. Driesen argues that feasibility analysis ensures that regulations do not 
impose excessively concentrated hardships on workers and communities that depend on the 
employment opportunities offered by industrial plants.143 His argument centers on the 
distributional consequences of regulation. Concentrated economic costs are more likely to 
diminish welfare because of the diminishing marginal value of money; it is more harmful (in 
welfare terms) for one person to lose $10,000 than for 10,000 people each to lose $1. Driesen 
favors environmental regulation in general because the types of harms caused by pollution—lung 
cancer, for instance—are borne by a few individuals, rather than spread. He supports feasibility 
analysis in particular because it largely ignores widespread costs borne by consumers (more on 
                                                 
141 Feasibility analysis emerged in part because an earlier effort to reduce risks to zero was abandoned. See 
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 123, at 180. 
142 In fact, scholars do this routinely. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the 
Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Analysis (January 2004), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=495462. 
143 Driesen, supra note 10, at 37-40 (tying the plant closing standard to a fear of excessive, concentrated layoffs). 
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this later) and concentrates only on avoiding unemployment—a harm borne by comparatively 
few individuals. 
 As an initial matter, the focus on avoiding concentrated harms does not justify feasibility 
analysis in a broad range of cases. For instance, suppose that feasibility analysis prevents OSHA 
from lowering the Cr (VI) exposure limit to 1 μg/m3 because of the threat of plant closings. The 
cost of implementing a weaker exposure limit, rather than this stricter limit, will fall on the 
workers who are stricken with lung cancer as a result. The same is true for environmental 
regulations: feasibility analysis may force regulators to trade the health (and lives) of a few 
individuals for the jobs of a greater number of workers. If the goal of feasibility analysis is to 
avoid concentrated harms, preventing job loss at the expense of allowing a greater number of 
serious illnesses makes little sense. And this is not even to mention the fact that regulations that 
do not cause “widespread plant closings” could nonetheless lead to widespread layoffs—that is, 
layoffs from plants that are not entirely shut down. 
 In addition, in an effort to emphasize larger concentrated costs over smaller dispersed  
ones, feasibility analysis errs by valuing those small costs at zero. The complete disregard of 
costs other than those related to job loss is deeply puzzling from a welfarist perspective.144 
Consider an average person, P. P has a job, breathes the air, eats food, drives a car, raises a 
family, purchases entertainment, pays for medical insurance, and so forth. The feasibility test 
ensures that a regulation takes account of P’s interest in keeping her job, in having a safe job, and 
in breathing the air, but ignores her interests in having cheap and healthy food, maintaining her 
car, buying goods for her family, and having access to inexpensive entertainment. Why should 
regulations take account of health, safety, and job loss, but nothing else? This same worker is 
also a consumer; regulations that raise costs for consumers hurt this worker just as polluted air 
does. Indeed, the regulation could lower P’s medical insurance premium by reducing risks that 
she faces, but at the same time, by raising the cost of goods, leave her with less disposable 
income for purchasing medical insurance in the first place. These effects cannot be evaluated if 
the effect of a regulation on the cost of goods is ignored. But that is exactly what the feasibility 
test does. 
 The approach of feasibility analysis thus creates significant problems of over- and 
underregulation. Overregulation occurs because feasibility analysis ignores the cost of 
regulations to consumers—the costs they incur because prices rise or products disappear from 
the market. Underregulation occurs because feasibility analysis tolerates dangerous industrial 
practices if regulation would shut down plants. As we have seen, OSHA’s approach to 
hexavalent chromium creates other perverse incentives: to reduce the size of firms, to avoid 
taking entrepreneurial risks, and so forth. EPA’s approach would also cause distortions—larger 
plants, thinner capitalization, et cetera. Cost-benefit analysis, by contrast, takes into account all 
the costs that regulations impose on consumers, as well as the benefits. 
                                                 
144 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 395, 445 
(2008); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1694 (1995). 
34 
 
 It is true that cost-benefit analysis has traditionally ignored the effect of regulation on 
employment. The reason is that economists tend to assume that labor markets will adjust in 
response to changes in the cost of inputs. Regulations raise the cost of inputs, but these costs can 
increase for exogenous reasons; these are simply the facts of life for any employer. In classical 
labor market models, firms will enter and exit the market in response to these shocks, and 
workers will lose their jobs and obtain jobs at other firms. The cost to workers, if there is one, is 
transitional only, and most cost-benefit analysts probably regard them as small relative to the 
regulatory benefits and costs to consumers. In addition, workers can self-insure against job loss, 
and governments often provide training and other assistance, which reduce the transition costs. 
But if all of this is a mistake—if it is appropriate to take into account the hardship costs to 
workers who lose their jobs—then cost-benefit analysis can easily accommodate these costs. 
Analysts would simply estimate the effect of a regulation on employment, and multiply that 
number by the estimated costs of transition or unemployment for the workers in question. In 
doing so, analysts would take account of macroeconomic and other conditions that affect the 
ability of workers to find new jobs. 
If cost-benefit analysis errs when translating dollars into welfare, this problem can be 
cured much more accurately and intelligently within the framework of cost-benefit analysis. 
Regulators could simply apply multipliers to highly concentrated benefits in accordance with 
economists’ best estimates of individuals’ welfare functions. The right approach cannot be to 
simply reduce some values in the equation to zero. 
 Clarity. We have mentioned the many vague concepts used in feasibility analysis.145 
Neither technological nor economic feasibility are well-defined concepts; the definition of 
industry is also largely arbitrary. Technological feasibility could mean technology that exists or 
technology that could be cheaply developed. Given problems of proof, agencies opted for the 
first definition, but even then faced challenges from industries that pointed out that technology 
that might work in some types of plants does not work in other types—or works only if it is 
modified, which requires further costs. We have discussed the problems of economic feasibility: 
the OSHA approach in the chromium rule is arbitrary; the EPA approach is indefinite. 
 The real problem is not the vagueness of words—words are always vague—but the 
absence of a theoretically coherent normative basis for feasibility analysis, a theory the analyst 
can draw upon in order to flesh out these terms in specific regulatory contexts. Cost-benefit 
analysis also uses vague terms, and requires some choices that are relatively arbitrary. But if the 
analyst keeps the overall goal of cost-benefit analysis in mind—the promotion of public well-
being—then the ambiguities can be resolved. Feasibility analysis’s notion of balancing 
employment and health/safety provides no similar guidance because it offers no theoretical way 
to determine the correct balance. 
 Driesen argues that feasibility analysis provides clear guidance, pointing out that in 
practice regulations tend to avoid plant-closings or revenue losses of more than one to three 
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percent; and that agencies usually do not require firms to develop new technologies.146 But this 
argument confuses the supposed analytic benefits of feasibility analysis and the ways in which 
agencies actually use it. If Driesen’s account is correct, it appears that agencies use the test in the 
most conservative way possible in order to avoid litigation or minimize the risk of harm. But that 
only suggests that agencies are massively under-regulating when they employ feasibility 
analysis. 
 Our own survey of feasibility analyses by agencies provides little evidence that this test 
guides or constrains agencies. As the chromium and paper mill regulations illustrate, the 
agencies’ use of the test seems to be ad hoc. The explanations are unpersuasive, the 
presumptions or rules they use arbitrary, and the recourse to exceptions frequent and 
inadequately justified. Agencies’ record with cost-benefit analysis is not perfect, either,147 and 
perhaps agencies could improve their feasibility analysis with practice and guidance from OMB. 
But on the evidence so far, the claim that feasibility analysis provides meaningful guidance is 
unsupported. 
 To be sure, feasibility analysis can be made arbitrarily specific, thus driving decision 
costs down. The OSHA chromium rule reflects such an attempt. But the error costs become 
huge. A regulation that could save many lives at relatively low cost becomes impossible because 
the industry is small or poor. Alternatively, feasibility analysis can remain vague, more of a 
standard, as in the EPA paper mill approach. Now, however, it becomes difficult to understand 
why EPA drew the line it did—one mill shutdown rather than two. At the same time, EPA 
continues to ignore costs that matter to people, such as the increase in price of paper. So even 
with high decision costs, error costs remain high as well. 
 
C. Does Feasibility Analysis Have an Alternative Normative Basis? 
 
 Let us return to the idea that feasibility analysis has an alternative normative basis.148 If it 
is not welfarist, what would that basis be? Philosophers distinguish consequentialist and 
deontological approaches to ethics. The consequentialist believes that acts should be evaluated 
on the basis of the goodness of their consequences; the deontologist believes that acts should be 
evaluated on the basis of their own quality—for example, one should not (presumptively) lie 
even when lying has good consequences. Within consequentialism, welfarism is only one 
version: one could care about consequences for people’s welfare but one could also care about 
consequences in other ways—for people’s virtue, for example. And then welfarism can be 
                                                 
146 Driesen, supra note 10, at 42-47. 
147 See Robert & Dudley, supra note 142; Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The 
Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); ECONOMIC 
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148 This was suggested by Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 2; Driesen et al., supra note 10, albeit without any clear 
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defined in various ways. Welfare might refer to positive subjective experience or mental states; 
the satisfaction of desires (or of certain desires); or objective goods (such as education).149 
 Feasibility analysis clearly does not reflect deontological thinking; we have argued that it 
does not reflect welfarism in any straightforward sense. Welfarism normally suggests that all 
aspects of a person’s well-being be taken into account, not just aspects of well-being related to 
employment, health, and safety. Perhaps, though, feasibility analysis can be based on a version 
of welfarism that stresses these conditions over all others. This could be attached to 
incommensurability worries—that certain values shouldn’t be traded off each other, that it is 
wrong for an agency to hold off regulating a substance that damages workers’ lungs so that 
consumer products will be a few dollars cheaper.150 
 Most economists reject this argument but philosophers have taken it seriously.151 One 
school of thought holds that goods contribute to well-being only if the agent would rationally 
prefer those goods under full information. Others argue that well-being is objective, in the sense 
that people’s well-being depends on their being able to engage in certain activities regardless of 
whether they actually desire to engage in these activities. Martha Nussbaum, for example, 
suggests the following objective list of qualities that comprise welfare: bodily health; bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation (including the 
goods of both friendship and self-respect); play; other species; and control over one’s 
environment (including both political rights and property rights).152 Other accounts emphasize 
different goods but are largely consistent.153 
 Feasibility analysis advances bodily health and bodily integrity but it does not take into 
account the other goods, with the result that regulations will favor only two of the eight items on 
Nussbaum’s list and, similarly, a small portion of the goods on other philosophers’ lists. 
Affiliation requires access to transportation so that one can visit friends, attend political 
meetings, and the like. Control over one’s environment presupposes the affordability of goods 
that one needs in order to manipulate the environment. Tradeoffs must be made. Sometimes 
these tradeoffs are tragic—people are forced to choose between goods about which they have 
fundamental entitlements.154 Sometimes they are not. If a person chooses to move from a very 
clean rural area to a very slightly polluted city in order to take advantage of cultural 
opportunities, but in doing so takes a miniscule risk of early death, this is hardly a tragedy. In 
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either case, a regulatory decision-procedure that requires agencies to focus on health and bodily 
integrity to the exclusion of all else would not advance people’s well-being. 
 If standard economic accounts of well-being are to be rejected and replaced with 
philosophical accounts that distrust (some of) people’s choices, that may be reasonable, but then 
the challenge is to invent a decision-procedure that reflects the proper interpretation of well-
being. An objective or limited desire-based approach will exclude certain goods and activities 
that people care about but not those that feasibility analysis ignores. Cost-benefit analysis will 
continue to be appropriate as long as a sufficient portion of consumer choices continue to be 
respected under the alternative approach. If not, it can be modified so that people’s preferences 
for objectively bad or rationally undesirable goods are ignored.155 
 But our goal is not to defend cost-benefit analysis. It is certainly possible that this 
decision-procedure is not consistent with the correct theory of well-being. It is, however, 
consistent with a range of reasonable conceptions of well-being. Feasibility analysis is not. No 
attempt to reverse-engineer a theory of well-being that justifies feasibility analysis has been 
successful. 
 
D. The Politics of Feasibility Analysis 
 
 If our analysis is correct so far, feasibility analysis does not necessarily have a pro- or 
anti-regulatory bias. In some sectors it results in overregulation; in others it results in 
underregulation. It is impossible to say anything more general. Yet in political debates, pro-
regulatory groups generally favor feasibility analysis, while anti-regulatory groups favor cost-
benefit analysis. What explains this pattern? 
 We do not know the answer but can speculate. Cost-benefit analysis is associated with 
the administration of Ronald Reagan, who sought to deregulate entire sectors of the economy 
and curtail regulation in others. Although cost-benefit analysis had been used in government 
before then, Reagan was the first to institutionalize it—to require agencies to use it as a matter of 
routine—and therefore cost-benefit analysis is associated with an anti-regulatory mentality. It 
may well have been introduced by Reagan’s OMB because he and other political leaders 
believed that most regulations do not in fact pass the cost-benefit test or because cost-benefit 
analysis would introduce bureaucratic hurdles that would at least slow down regulation.156 
Whatever they might have thought, many regulations since then have passed the cost-benefit 
test.157 
 Feasibility analysis, by contrast, has been understood to apply when statutes forbid 
considerations of cost, and it would therefore naturally seem to support strict regulations that are 
not clearly cost-justified. As we have seen, however, the technological and economic feasibility 
                                                 
155 See Adler & Posner, supra note 8, at 124-53 (describing a process for laundering preferences). 
156 Adler & Posner, supra note 8, at 3-4 (analyzing the political economy of cost-benefit analysis). 
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conditions can be interpreted in quite a stringent way, so as to bar regulation that cost-benefit 
analysis would permit. In their anxiety to refute cost-benefit analysis, proponents of regulation 
have had to fall back on feasibility analysis as an alternative, but they have not realized that 
feasibility analysis might be no more favorable to regulation than cost-benefit analysis is. 
 Indeed, there is a possible public choice interpretation of feasibility analysis that is in 
tension with good-government premises: it may reflect a political deal between industry, on the 
one hand, and environmental or labor groups, on the other. Industry receives protection from 
regulations that greatly reduce profits; environmental and labor groups obtain reductions in 
workplace accidents and environmental pollution. The loser is the consumer, whose interests 
receive zero weight. This pattern is reproduced in the dispute over the meaning of feasibility 
itself. Most of the interpretations of this term—those emphasizing plant closures, lost revenues, 
lost profits, and firm bankruptcies—favor organized interests. Plant closures outrage 
communities and their political representatives. Lost revenues and profits, and bankruptcies, 
make businesses unhappy. Job loss that is spread across industries receives no attention, just like 
consumer welfare, because the affected people are not politically organized. 
 Why then has industry shifted its support to cost-benefit analysis? One possibility is that 
feasibility analysis in the hands of agencies proved so easily manipulated that the deal came 
unstuck. Agencies, staffed with people deeply committed to their regulatory mission, went 
beyond the limits that feasibility analysis was supposed to impose—or so businesses might have 
believed.158 Businesses threw their weight behind Ronald Reagan and supported cost-benefit 
analysis because at least that approach is more predictable. Or it may be that presidents—
including Reagan’s successors—are not as vulnerable to interest group pressure as Congress is, 
and so insisted on cost-benefit analysis because it would improve public welfare, possibly 
redounding to the electoral benefit of the president, rather than send rents to interest groups. This 
would explain why the executive branch has championed cost-benefit analysis across five 
administrations (both Democratic and Republican), while Congress has wavered between the 
standards, influenced sometimes by businesses and at other times by pro-regulatory groups. 
 A final point: it is possible to imagine conditions under which feasibility is both pro-
regulatory in impact and desirable from a broad social welfare standpoint, but these conditions 
are very unlikely to exist. Suppose that agencies have “ideal points”—in the language of political 
science—at the same place in the political spectrum that the public has.159 Agencies, in other 
words, are good agents for the public interest. Cost-benefit analysis, correctly performed, would 
put agencies in the same location on the ideological spectrum. However, cost-benefit analysis is 
expensive and crude160 and accordingly would create a drag on otherwise optimal regulation. 
Perhaps in this case a weaker standard such as feasibility would be preferable. But this argument 
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for feasibility analysis is very tricky. No standard at all would be better still if agencies act in the 
public interest when unconstrained; the feasibility standard would be desirable only if agencies 
tend to underestimate harm to workers and overestimate costs to consumers, so that a direction to 
pay attention to workers and ignore consumers would somehow balance out the agencies’ natural 
inclinations and produce optimal incentives to regulate. If this is the case for feasibility 
analysis—and it is the only one we can think of—a great deal of empirical work would be 
necessary to prevail over one’s natural skepticism about the accuracy of these premises. 
 One could put this argument differently. If agencies are inclined to under-regulate, and 
cost-benefit analysis would only exacerbate this tendency because of the costs and hurdles it 
introduces, then it may well make sense to refrain from requiring agencies to conduct cost-
benefit analysis. But some standard must be used. Feasibility analysis does not necessarily 
correct for the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis because it invites agencies to stop regulating 
in order to avoid negative economic impacts. At the same time, it encourages agencies to ignore 
other costs that matter. The most straightforward solution to the problem of under-regulation—if 
it is a problem, which is far from clear—would be to fund and staff agencies more generously 
and to invest in improvements in the practice of cost-benefit analysis. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 We have discovered no reason for agencies to use feasibility analysis, and, given its 
ambiguity and its unacceptable normative implications, we doubt that agencies actually allow it 
to guide their decision-making. Most likely, agencies engage in informal cost-benefit balancing 
while taking into account political constraints that exist because of public (or congressional) 
hostility to plant closings, or they simply strike a deal with employers and labor and 
environmental groups at the expense of consumers. Whether feasibility analysis actually 
constrains agencies or serves as a subterfuge for decisions arrived at on other grounds, it has no 
place in regulatory decisionmaking. 
 Remedies are straightforward. Where statutes delegate agencies policymaking authority, 
those agencies should exercise their power under the Chevron doctrine to replace feasibility 
analysis with cost-benefit analysis or another suitable decision-procedure. OIRA should 
encourage agencies to take this step; it might reasonably go so far as to forbid agencies to use 
feasibility analysis to the extent permitted by law. Courts should adopt a presumption that 
regulatory statutes do not authorize feasibility analysis. Congress should refrain from 
incorporating the feasibility test in regulatory statutes, and should amend existing statutes so that 
they no longer do so. 
40 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Selected Feasibility-Triggering Statutes 
Statute Name U.S. Code 
Number 
Language 
(Emphasis Added) 
“Feasible” Statutes 
The Occupational 
Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 
29 U.S.C. § 652(8) “…requires conditions…reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide…” 
29 U.S.C. § 
655(b)(5) 
“…the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on 
the basis of the best available evidence…” 
Mine Act 30 U.S.C. § 
811(a)(6)(A) 
“…standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best 
available evidence that no miner will suffer material impairment…” 
Additional considerations to “highest degree of health and safety” 
include “the latest available scientific data…, the feasibility of the 
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety 
laws.” 
“Best Available” / “Maximum Available” Statutes 
Clean Air Act 
- Prevention of 
Significant 
Deterioration 
program 
 
 
- National 
Ambient Air 
Quality Standards 
42 U.S.C. § 
7475(a)(4) 
“…subject to the best available control technology for each pollutant…” 
42 U.S.C. § 
7479(3) 
Defines BACT as “…maximum degree of reduction…taking into 
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other 
costs…” 
Clean Air Act 
- Emission 
Standards 
42 U.S.C. § 
7412(d)(2) 
“maximum degree of reduction…achievable..taking into consideration 
the cost of achieving such emission reduction…” 
 
Clean Air Act 
- Standards of 
Performance for 
New Stationary 
Sources 
42 U.S.C. § 
7411(a)(1) 
“best system of emission reduction…taking into account the cost…and 
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements…[that has been] adequately demonstrated”  
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Clean Water Act 
 
33 U.S.C. § 
1326(b) 
“…reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse 
environmental impact…” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2)(A)(i)  
“best available technology economically achievable…, which will result 
in reasonable further progress…” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1314(b)(2)(B) 
Factors “shall” include “age of equipment and facilities involved, the 
process employed, the engineering aspects of the application…, process 
changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality 
environment impact (including energy requirements), and such other 
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate.” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2) 
“best available demonstrated control technology” taking cost into 
account 
33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2)(B) 
“…take into account…the cost of achieving such effluent reduction.” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1316(a)(1) 
“…greatest degree of effluent reduction…achievable through…best 
available demonstrated control technology…” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1316(b)(1)(B) 
“…take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, 
and any non-water quality environmental impact and energy 
requirements.” 
“Reasonably Available” / “Best Practicable” Statutes 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 
7502(c)(1) 
 
(formerly 42 
U.S.C. § 
7502(b)(3)) 
 
“…through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available control 
technology” 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(1)(A)(i)  
“best practicable control technology currently available” 
33 U.S.C. § 
1314(b)(1)(B) 
“Factors…include consideration of the total cost of application of 
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved.” 
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Table A2: OSHA’s Analysis of Chromium High-Impact Industries 
Industry Compliance 
Costs as a 
Percentage of 
Revenue 
Compliance 
Costs as a 
Percentage of 
Profits 
Explanation of Deviation from Screening 
Electroplating – General Industry 
Specialty Trade 
Contractors (NAICS 
238) 
0.43% 11.14% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Electroplating, Plating, 
Polishing Anodizing and 
Coloring Services 
(NAICS 332813) 
1.24% 30.15% Sells service not product, so overseas competition 
shouldn’t be strong. Electroplating is “essential to 
the manufacture of most plated products,” 
implying that demand is unlikely to decrease. 
Experienced and survived profit variation of up to 
49% in single year. 1.24% price increase is 
“significantly less than the average annual increase 
in price.” Demand is inelastic because plating just 
a component of product’s total cost (less than 
0.5%). 
71 Fed. Reg. 10301  
Wholesale Trade, 
Durable Goods (NAICS 
423) 
0.28% 11.01% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Motor Vehicle and Parts 
Dealers (NAICS 441) 
0.23% 16.27% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Furniture and Home 
Furnishing Stores 
(NAICS 442) 
0.66% 17.59% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Electronics and 
Appliance Stores 
(NAICS 443) 
0.50% 14.70% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Building Materials and 
Garden Equipment and 
Supplies Dealers 
(NAICS 444) 
0.55% 11.18% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Health and Personal 
Care Stores (NAICS 
446) 
0.44% 17.46% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Miscellaneous Store 
Retailers (NAICS 453) 
0.71% 22.73% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Nonstore Retailers 
(NAICS 454) 
0.61% 16.01% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Information Services 
and Data Processing 
Service (NAICS 519) 
3.12% 35.01% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Rental and Leasing 
Services (NAICS 532) 
0.86% 34.20% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Professional, Scientific, 0.85% 13.52% Only a few establishments reported use. 
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and Technical Services 
(NAICS 541) 
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Administrative and 
Support Services 
(NAICES 561) 
1.05% 27.60% Not counted in the tally of 31 high impact 
industries and no explanation given. Likely only a 
few establishments reported use. 
Performing Arts, 
Spectator Sports, and 
Related Industries 
(NAICS 711) 
5.17% 54.93% Only one establishment reported use; possible 
mistake.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Personal and Laundry 
Services (NAICS 812) 
2.58% 49.92% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Welding - General Industry (Stainless Steel) 
Gasoline Stations 
(NAICS 447) 
0.22% 29.52% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Nursing and Residential 
Care (NAICS 623) 
1.56% 30.07% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Social Assistance 
(NAICS 624) 
1.14% 22.34% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Food Services and 
Drinking Places (NAICS 
722) 
0.49% 11.93% Only a few establishments reported use.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Repair and Maintenance 
(NAICS 811) 
0.40% 10.49% Given that it is a service industry, demand for 
repairs should remain relatively constant and 
foreign competition should not pose a problem. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Personal and Laundry 
Services (NAICS 812) 
0.67% 13.02% Given that it is a service industry, demand for 
repairs should remain relatively constant and 
foreign competition should not pose a problem. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Religious, Grantmaking, 
Civil, Professional and 
Similar Organizations 
(NAICS 813)  
3.91% 158.08% Only one establishment reported use; possible 
mistake.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Welding – Construction Industry (Stainless Steel) 
Building, Developing, 
and General 
Contracting; Heavy 
Construction; Special 
Trade Contractors 
(NAICS 233, 234, 235) 
0.92% 22.33% Passing costs on would only increase price 0.92% 
and steel prices have varied more than 10% a year 
without affecting the industry. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Welding - General Industry (Carbon Steel) 
Religious, Grantmaking, 
Civil, Professional and 
Similar Organizations 
(NAICS 813)  
1.00% 40.34% Only one establishment reported use; possible 
mistake.  
71 Fed. Reg. 10300 
Painting – General Industry 
Motor Vehicle Body and 
Trailer Manufacturing 
0.51% 20.44% Merely part of manufacturing process, so the 
actual cost is insignificant in terms of the final 
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(NAICS 3362) product price and should be largely passed on. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Military Armored 
Vehicle, Tank, and Tank 
Component 
Manufacturers (NAICS 
336992) 
0.25% 10.14% Merely part of manufacturing process, so the 
actual cost is insignificant in terms of the final 
product price and should be largely passed on. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Used Car Dealers 
(NAICS 44112) 
0.41% 33.66% Cr (VI) alternatives already exist, the use of Cr 
(VI) is only a small portion of the actual business, 
and demand is probably fairly inelastic. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Automotive Body, Paint, 
and Interior Repair and 
Maintenance (NAICS 
811121) 
1.50% 39.16% Cr (VI) alternatives are already developed, the use 
of Cr (VI) is only a small portion of the actual 
business, and demand is probably fairly inelastic. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Chromium Catalyst Producers 
All Other Basic 
Inorganic Chemical 
Manufacturers (NAICS 
325188) 
0.80% 27.14% Short-term demand is relatively inelastic since 
most companies would need major new 
investments to shift away from CR(VI) catalysts. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
Iron and Steel Foundries 
Iron Foundries; Steel 
Investment Foundries; 
Steel Foundries (Except 
Investment) (NAICS 
3315, 331512, 331513) 
0.42% 15.30% Monitoring costs make up 44% of estimated 
compliance costs, but such costs could be reduced 
to less than 10% of profits if performance-based 
monitoring is used instead of scheduled periodic 
monitoring. Industry has absorbed 32% increase in 
price of steel over past two years and survived. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302  
Chromium Catalyst Users – Service Companies 
Other Services to 
Buildings and 
Dwellings, Including 
Catalyst Handling 
(NAICS 325110) 
0.44% 11.59% Demand should remain constant since companies 
are more likely to turn to service companies when 
regulation increased. 
71 Fed. Reg. 10302 
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